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Secondary Predication in Russian
￿
Abstract
The paper makes two contributions to semantic typology of secondary predicates. It
provides an explanation of the fact that Russian has no resultative secondary predicates,
relating this explanation to the interpretation of secondary predicates in English. And it
relates depictive secondary predicates in Russian, which usually occur in the instrumental
case, to other uses of the instrumental case in Russian, establishing here, too, a difference
to English concerning the scope of the secondary predication phenomenon.
1 Introduction
1.1 Secondary predication
There are many problems surrounding the phenomenon of secondary predication, and the great-
est of them is the absence of an a priori deﬁnition of the phenomenon. Thus, we must live with
the absence of the criteria of what data counts as manifesting the phenomenon a priori, and turn
to the aims and claims of linguistics. The idea behind introducing a piece of linguistic termi-
nology is to propose that there is some interesting linguistic generalization behind it. In the
case of secondary predication the usual procedure is to introduce some examples and call them
secondary predicates. Of course, some core must be intuitively present. We would like to recall
the core in this section and start by reviewing some history.
Part of the phenomenon which would later come to be known as secondary predication in En-
glish was described by Jespersen as nexus-object (Jespersen, 1924, the quotation is from p. 122
ff. of the 1963 reprint). Jespersen described nexus as the relation covering, e. g., the two terms
the dog and barks in the dog barks, but also cases like I found the cage empty. The idea was
probably that the relation between the cage and empty is very similar to the one between the
cage and is empty in the cage is empty. Jespersen insists that the nexus-object is the whole un-
derlined phrase, i. e. it is an object containing a nexus. He comments that it is usual to say about
’I found the cage empty’
...that the cage is the object and that empty is used predicatively of, or with, the
object, but it is more correct to look upon the whole combination the cage empty as
the object.
￿We are greatly indebted to Hans Martin Gaertner and Manfred Krifka for their illuminating criticism and
discussions. We would also like to thank Henk Zeevat and Reinhard Blutner for their interest in the topic and
critical comments. Tanks to Steven Wechsler for discussing problems of resultatives with us. The syntactic part
owes much to John Frederic Bailyn, hence our thanks to him.
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His argument runs like this (though not quite in these words): in (1) and (2) the inferences from
(a) to (b) do not go through.
(1) a. I found Fanny gone
b. I found Fanny
(2) a. I found Fanny not at home
b. I found Fanny
Thelogicalformofboth(1a)and(2a)couldbesomethinglikeIfound(Fanny)
 
:athome(Fanny),
from which I found(Fanny) should follow, which it does not. So, assume Fanny gone to be an
object, and the inference is blocked. If so, and if nexus is a clause-deﬁning relation, we have a
clausal object.
Moreover, Jespersen assumed that
...verbs otherwise intransitive may take a nexus-object of result: he slept him-
self sober
thus proposing the clausal analysis also for a part of what later became known as resultative
secondary predication or simply resultatives. Jespersen thus suggested a treatment which was
later reintroduced under the name of the small clause analysis of resultatives (Hoekstra, 1988).
Other ingredients of the theory sketched by Jespersen are the nature of the secondary predicates
and similarities to AcI-clauses. Quote Jespersen:
...The predicate part of the nexus my be any word or group that can be a pred-
icative after the verb to be.
...The close analogy between the accusative with the inﬁnitive and this nexus-
object makes it easy to understand that we sometimesﬁnd the sameverb taking both
constructions in the same sentence: he felt himself dishonored and his son to be an
evil in the tribe (Wister).
Assuming that AcI-constructions are clausal, plus the constraint on the type parallelism of terms
in conjunction, Jespersen’s hypothesis would nicely account for the observation.
That the clausal analysis is not without weakness becomes clear on a moment’s inspection: the
desirable inference seems to be absolutely correct in (3).
(3) a. John drank the coffee cold
b. John drank the coffee
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Is this not a nexus object? Is then there a difference between this sentence and I found the coffee
cold? Or merely a difference between the latter and (1)? How do we go about extrapolating
from (1) to (3)? Should we extrapolate?
The position which Jespersen criticizes without naming its proponents is to analyze cold in (3)
as a non-clausal phrasal constituent, i. e. predicative constituent which does not have a sub-
ject. Assuming the basic logical form of John drank
 
 
 
 coffee
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
  we readily obtain
John drank
 
 
 
 coffee
 
 
 . This position was articulated in the generative literature in Williams
(1980) and Rothstein (1983). It would probably deny that (1) exhibits the same kind of structure
as (3), so is there a class of data pointing out to some interesting linguistic generalization which
deserved the unifying term secondary predication? And if yes, how do we proceed determining
it, given that we only have an ostensive deﬁnition of its prototypical cases?
The main ingredients of secondary predication for ﬁnite clauses seem to be the following:
￿ in addition to a ﬁnite verb in a ﬁnite clause there must be at least one constituent which is
able to occur as the predicate of the copula sentence,
￿ it serves as a semantic predicate of some constituent in the clause, although there is no
explicit copula present which mediates this relation,
￿ the group including this predicate and the subject it is predicated of has roughly the se-
mantic type of a clause,
￿ the structure of the clause with secondary predication is approximately the conjunction of
the matrix clause with the secondary predicate clause.
Giventhis, considertheﬁrstmentionofsecondary predicationinRussianingenerativeliterature.
In her paper on secondary predicates Johanna Nichols (Nichols, 1978) distinguishedfour groups
of secondary predicates, though she acknowledged that they were also called other names, in-
cluding types of nexus. The four groups are illustrated below. The examples are Nichols’.
Major types of secondary predicates after Nichols (1978)
Type 1
(4) a. he works as an engineer
b. they elected him president
c. rocks serve them as support
d. he played goalkeeper
Type 2
(5) a. he sat there sad
b. he returned a hero
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Type 3
(6) a. ﬁrst they weigh the truck empty
b. he drank the tea cold
Type 4
(7) a. as a child he lived in Paris
b. this tea isn’t good cold
Running down the list of symptoms for secondary predication questions the inclusion of (4a-4b,
7a) because of the particle as, and (7b) because of different entailments. The entailments of (4b)
are also suspect. So what are Nichols’ reasons to speak of a uniﬁed phenomenon in all four
types1?
Nicholsproposes, in theterminologyofthat time, that“All theexamplesgivenwouldbederived
...from structures in which the main verb and the secondary predicate appeared in separate
clauses, each as a predicate of its own clause...”. This seems to be the basic idea: there are
two clauses, each of which with a separate predicational structure. Which ﬁts, after all, the
property catalog, though only inner-theoretically. Moreover, Nichols considers as to be just
a morphological expression of secondary predication, which can also be left morphologically
unexpressed. What about the fourth type?
Type fourcontains temporal, concessiveand conditionaluses of secondary predicates, according
to Nichols. It is rather different from the ﬁrst three, as she notes, and uses paraphrases to show
the difference, cf (8).
(8) a. as a child he lived in Paris
b. when he was a child, he lived in Paris
c. this tea isn’t good cold
d. when this tea is cold, it isn’t good
e. he drank the tea cold
f. when he drank the tea, it was cold
The inference to thematrixclause, e. g. in (8c) onlygoes through, ifthesecondary predication is
satisﬁed. For the moment it is therefore not quite clear whether the term secondary predication
should be taken to cover type 4. And we see no reason to distinguish between the other types on
the basis of our criteria.
Apart from these four types Nichols mentions separately the type usually termed resultative
secondary predication, e. g. (9).
1To quote: “I will argue for the unity of the generic relation of secondary predicate and for the reality of the
numbered subtypes above”.
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(9) a. wash it clean
b. sand it smooth
c. laugh yourself sick
This type differs intuitivelyin that the state which is described by the secondary predicate comes
about as the result of the change which happens with the predication subject. This change is
associated with the process denoted by th verb.
Right from the start it should be said that resultative secondary predication is not available
in Russian, and therefore we are not interested in the restrictions on the resultative secondary
predication2. But we are, naturally, interested in the reason why this type is not present in
Russian and we hope to be able to provide an explanation. This will be one aim of the paper.
Establishing the relation of the ﬁrst three types to their counterparts in Russian and providing
the semantics to all of them will be the second aim of the paper.
1.2 Secondary Predication in Russian
First, we will delimit the scope of the present work. We only consider secondary predicates
which are based on nouns or on adjectives, or which are prepositional phrases. Other categories
present additional problems of their own. Again, we start out following Nichols. The abbrevi-
ation ’instr’ indicates that the word is in the instrumental case, ’acc’ that it is in the accusative,
’dat’ in the dative, and ’nom’ in the nominative.
Major types of Russian secondary predicates after Nichols (1978)
Type 1
(10) a. On rabotaet inˇ zenerom
he works engineer-instr
he works as an engineer
b. ego vybrali prezidentom
he-acc elected-3-pl president-instr
they elected him president
c. kamni im sluˇ zat oporoj
rocks they-dat serve support-instr
rocks serve them as support
d. on igral vratarem
he played goalkeeper-instr
he played goalkeeper
Type 2
2See Winkler (1997), Rothstein (2000) and Rothstein (2001) as well as Rappaport Hovav and Levin (1998) and
Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995)
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(11) a. on sidel grustnyj
he-nom sat sad-nom
he sat there sad
b. on vernuls’a gerojem
he returned hero-instr
he returned a hero
Type 3
(12) a. snaˇ cala maˇ sinu vzveˇ sivajut pustuju
ﬁrst the truck-acc weigh empty-instr
ﬁrst they weigh the truck empty
b. on vypil ˇ caj xolodnym
he drank the tea-acc cold-instr
he drank the tea cold
Type 4
(13) a. reb’onkom on ˇ zil v Pariˇ ze
child-instr he lived in Paris
as a child he lived in Paris
b. xolodnym etot ˇ caj nevkushyj
cold-instr this tea-nom not tasty-nom
this tea isn’t good cold
The examples show that the secondary predicate in Russian, if secondary predication is not
reﬂected morphologically, is usually in the instrumental case, though it may be in the case of the
subject term of the secondary predication , e. g. in nominative in (11a).
This morphological marking of the secondary predicate constitutes a major difﬁculty for an
analysis of Russian secondary predication. As is well known, Russian instrumental has quite a
number of uses which do not necessarily have a corresponding secondary predicate in Englishor
in German. Consider (14). This example is taken from Jakobson (1936), reprinted in Jakobson
(1984). The translations of the DPs in the instrumental are in italics.3
(14) a. On el reb’onkom
 
 
 
 
  ikru
He ate child-instr caviar
He ate caviar as a child
b. On el pudami
 
 
 
 
  ikru
He ate pud-instr caviar
He ate caviar by the pood (36lbs)
3The literal translation of the idiom in (14f) would be sinful matter.
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c. On el loˇ zkoj
 
 
 
 
  ikru
He ate spoon-instr caviar
He ate caviar with a spoon
d. On el dorogoj
 
 
 
 
  ikru
He ate road-instr caviar
He ate caviar on the way
e. On el utrom
 
 
 
 
  ikru
He ate morning-instr caviar
He ate caviar in the morning
f. On el greˇ snym
 
 
 
 
  delom
 
 
 
 
  ikru
He ate sinful-instr matter-instr caviar
He ate caviar I am sorry to say
The italicized prepositions clearly show that rather different relations between the DP in the
instrumental and the rest of the sentence are involved. Of these, Nichols would classify (14a) as
secondary predication. What about therest? Moreover, there are even morepotentialcandidates.
Wierzbicka (Wierzbicka, 1980) counted seventeen uses of the instrumental case in Russian, cf.
(14).
(15) a. Ivan udaril Petra palkoj
Ivan hit Peter stick-instr
Ivan hit Peter with a stick
b. Ivan ˇ svyryal kamnjami
Ivan was throwing stones-instr
Ivan was throwing stones
c. Ivan kivnul golovoj
Ivan nodded head-instr
Ivan nodded with his head
d. Deti ob”jelis’ slivami
The children ate-reﬂ plums-instr
The children overfed themselves on plums
e. Ivan gordils’a synom
Ivan was proud son-instr
Ivan was proud of his son
f. Ivana ubilo derevom
Ivan-acc killed-neut tree-instr
Ivan was killed by a tree
g. Okno bylo razbito det’mi
The window was broken children-instr
The window was broken by the children
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h. Ivan nagruzil telegu senom
Ivan loaded the wagon hey-instr
Ivan loaded the wagon with hey
i. Ivan xarkal krov’ju
Ivan coughed blood-instr
Ivan coughed blood
j. On vyl volkom
He howled wolf-instr
He howled like a wolf
k. Ona plakala gor’kimi slezami
She cried bitter tears-instr
She cried bitter tears
l. On ˇ sol lesom
He was going wood-instr
He was going through the wood
m. On priˇ sel noˇ cju
He came night-instr
He came in the night
n. On ˇ casami vozilsja s radiopriemnikom
He hours-instr was busy with receiver-
He was busying himself with the receiver for hours
o. On prijexal avtomaˇ sinoj
He arrived car-instr
He arrived by car
p. Ona byla bledna licom
She was pale face-instr
She was pale in the face
q. On byl togda titul’arnym sovetnikom
He was then titular-councellor-instr
He was a titular councillor then
Some ofthem were already mentionedin discussingNichols, somewere mentionedin theexam-
pleofJakobson,somearenew. Takenatfacevalue, thereisaplethoraofusesoftheinstrumental,
which seem unrelated, and it is unclear why secondary predicates are marked by instrumental.
There are two interesting facts about case assignment in secondary predication structures in
Russian. Secondary predicates of subjects may occur in the nominative, secondary predicates of
objects may occur in the accusative, cf (16) where (16a) illustrates the ﬁrst and (16b) the second
case.
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(16) a. on vypil ˇ caj sonnym/sonnyj
he drank the tea-acc sleepy-instr/nom
sleepy, he drank up the tea
b. snaˇ cala maˇ sinu vzveˇ sivajut pustuju/
?pustoj
ﬁrst the truck-acc weigh empty-acc/instr
ﬁrst they weigh the truck empty
This case assignment is called congruent case. The factors governing the distribution of the two
are not as yet clear, and this probably is also in need of explanation.
The second fact is an interesting restriction on this congruent case assignment: the alternation
instrumental/congruentcase is impossiblefor nouns as SPs. Thus, (17a,17b,18b) are acceptable,
whereas (18b) is not.
(17) a. on vernuls’a domoj ustalym
he-nom returned home tired-instr
He came back home tired
b. on vernuls’a domoj direktorom
he-nom returned home director-instr
He came back home a director
(18) a. on vernuls’a domoj ustalyj
he-nom returned home tired-nom
He came back home tired
b. *on vernuls’a domoj direktor
he-nom returned home director-npm
He came back home a director
We would like to present a treatment which uniﬁes the treatment of secondary predication with
many uses of the instrumental. Under this treatment Russian uses instrumental in general to
mark secondary predicates, and therefore secondary predication turns out to be a much more
pervasive phenomenon, than in English.
In constructing a semantics which is able to support this claim we will resort to the notion of
contextually computablemeaning. A similar idea concerning the uses of instrumental is implicit
in the work of one of the most interesting Russian linguists of the beginning of the 20th century
Alexandr Matveeviˇ c Peˇ skovskij (Peˇ skovskij, 1956). Discussing different shades of use of the
instrumental which he termed semi-predicative (e. g. Nichols’ example (10a)), he writes
These shades of meaning, as it seems, depend more on the material side of the
speech...
From the following discussion it is clear that he meant that the ﬁnal interpretation of this sec-
ondary predication depends on the contextual knowledge which speciﬁes the relation between
the term in the instrumental and the situation described by the matrix sentence.
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We therefore tentatively identify the three basic ingredients of the program for the treatment of
secondary predication in Russian which we propose in this paper. It will have a uniform small
clausesyntaxforsecondarypredication, auniformgeneral interpretationoftheinstrumentalcase
as the case of secondary predication, and a uniform semantic core together with a mechanism of
contextual speciﬁcation of this core semantic interpretation.
We will start by discussing the syntax of secondary predication. The aim of section 2 is to
provide an account of the instrumental case form and an account of syntactic relations which
are involved in the interpretation of sentences with secondary predication. Section 3 presents a
general formal developmentof an inferential context-dependent semantics. We use this develop-
ment to givethen in section 4 the core cases of secondary predication in Russian (thedepictives).
As the main contribution of this paper, we discuss the reasons for the absence of resultative sec-
ondary predication in Russian in this section. It also contains the discussion of how other uses
of the Russian instrumental could be integrated into this treatment. Section 5 provides a short
summary.
The literature on secondary predication is vast, and we shall only be able to mention alternatives
at points where the difference between it and our approach can elucidate the latter, or where an
alternative makes contrary assumptions which we think not really conﬂicting with ours. For a
very good discussion of different approaches see Winkler (1997) and Boas (2000).
2 The syntax of SP in Russian
This section deals with the syntactic object ”secondary predicate”, i. e. its constituency, its
position in the sentence structure and with syntactic factors its morphological properties are due
to. The aim of this section is to provide an account of the instrumental case form and an ac-
count of syntactic relations which are involved in the interpretation of sentences with secondary
predication.
Vergnaud (1985) suggested that case marking is basically a morphological reﬂex of syntactic
relations. According to his theory and in general terms, a case form
  is assigned to a case-
bearing element
 , if this element is in some syntactic relation to a speciﬁed element
  and if
a certain syntactic proximity is observed. Chomsky (2000) is the most recent sketch of such
a theory. Note that no semantics is involved, although differences in case forms may correlate
with semantic distinctions, in principle. Sometimes the notion ”semantic case” is used in the
literature. Baker (1988, p. 113) deﬁnes that a semantic case is assigned whenever its form is
associated with a set thematic role, e. g. ablative is a semantic case in Estonian, because it is
associated with the thematic role source. Semantic case in this sense need not be inconsistent
with the relational case theory, if we assume that there need not be a unique case assignment
under one syntactic relation. Such an assumption is independently motivated for Russian, as we
will note
later. Thus, to account for the instrumental in secondary predication we need to specify the
syntactic relation it is associated with, and the proximity domain of its assignment.
We shall suggest that two forms of case assignment to secondary predicates are due to two
different properties of its case assigner. Moreover, congruent case is in part a consequence of
subject-predicate agreement. We shall also suggest that the prohibition of the congruent case
might have a partially syntactic explanation.
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2.1 Formal assumptions
The proposals discussed below are to a high degree adaptations of various ideas. We assume the
syntactic framework outlined in Chomsky (2000). The framework is suggested there to be used
for theory building and not to be treated as a ﬁnal coherent formal statement. Consequently, we
will have to make suggestions at some points where the paper has no solutions, but we do not
insist that they are the best possible. The minimalist framework of the cited paper dispenses
with the tree notions as a structural skeleton of the theory. If they are to be used at all, then
only for expository purposes. Consequently, if there are syntactic relations relevant to phono-
logical/phonetic or semantic properties, they are deﬁned in terms not involving tree geometry.
The theory works with syntactic objects on which three fundamental operations Merge, Agree,
and Move are deﬁned. The basic objects are lexicon items which are composed of features. The
correct formalization of features being not uniquely determined yet, we decided to use a suitable
one. The ﬁrst basic operation, Merge is responsible for the construction of new syntactic objects
from given ones: two syntactic objects are merged to produce a third one. We consider Merge
applicableifoneobject whichis an argument oftheMergeoperation selectstheotherargument4.
We see the status of selection in the minimalist program more like that of a functional type a
in the categorial grammar than the selectional requirement of the Aspects-theory. The relation
of selection holds if one object has a requirement on what information is to be in the other
object with which it forms a new syntactic object via Merge operation and this object satisﬁes
the requirement. Informally we will distinguish between semantic selection, under which we
indirectly select the semantic type of the syntactic object via some syntactic feature associated
with it, and syntactic selection, where syntactic features are selected on their own merits. To
forestallmisunderstandings: sinceweare inthedomainof syntax, no semantictypesare actually
available. Thecheckingofsemanticconditionsisdoneinsemantics. Thesyntaxmerelyprovides
some feature value of the feature selected to indicate that syntactic selection encompasses the
intended semantics. Thus, we may have cross-categorial syntactic features which are bound to
semantic types. For example, some such semantic selection feature could probably encompass
both nouns which denote eventualities and sentences, so that a semantic selectional feature with
this value could cover both sentences and nouns denoting eventualities, and verbs can use this
feature in their selectional requirements.
Following Chomsky we distinguish two kinds of
 
 
 
 
  operation which differ in their result.
If
  and
  are syntactic objects, we have either
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
f
 
 
 
g, i. e. the set of two objects,
where either
  selects
  or
  selects
 , or adjunction
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , with the ordered
pair as the result. Here
  is adjoined to
 .
The second operation, Agree, is deﬁned within a syntactic object on its parts. Some objects
contain a set
  of active formal agreement features. These features must be rendered inactive
beforetheobject can beused at an interface levelofthesyntax withothersubsystemsinvolvedin
linguisticprocessing. The presence of purely formal agreement features at the interface levels of
the syntax indicates the incorrectness of the object5. Therefore, if another object in the domain
of Agree has a matching set, Agree applies. Such a formal agreement feature
  is called the
4This is in broad agreement with Chomsky (2000), though perhaps not with other variations of minimalism.
The passages we consider relevant are on pp. 133, 134, 138. The idea is this: “When
￿,
￿ merge, it is to satisfy
(selectional) requirements of one (the selector) but not both”. The operation will be deﬁned as producing sets, but
it is inherently asymmetric, since it is not simply set formation. The difference is in the application conditions.
5The minimalist terminology is they cause the derivation of the object to crash.
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probe, the matching feature is called the goal. If all such feature matches are established, the
syntactic object is complete with respect to Agree. Given syntactic object
 
 
f
 
 
 
g, the
domain of Agree is
 , if the probe is in
 . The goal with respect to the probe is either
  or
  is
the minimal domain of the operation (Chomsky, 2000). This means that if
 
 
f


 
 
g either

 or
  must contain the goal.
After it is established that Agree holds, the original probe is modiﬁed so that the formal agree-
ment features are erased and the object becomes syntactically inactive. In principle, both the
probe and the goal are modiﬁed under agreement. If, however, the agreement features in the
goal are considered to be interpretable, they must remain, though they turn inactive and cannot
trigger another Agree operation.
The operation Agree indirectly deﬁnes the role of the feature case in the framework. If case-
feature of a syntactic object
  has a well-deﬁned value, this object is said to be case-marked and
the case is said to be assigned. Nouns have a case feature and a set of formal agreement features
(
 -features) which may serve as the goal of Agree. The
 -features of the noun are considered to
be interpretable. If the agreement features on the noun are to be marked as inactive, but cannot
be deleted, there must be a mechanism to mark them so. The case feature gets a value under
Agree instead of erasing
 . The noun is thus signaled to be inactive, or ﬂagged by case. The
ﬂag indicates the successful result of the operation and the inactive state of the
 -features of the
goal. The value of case feature depends on the probe, which is said to assign the case. Thus,
for instance, we will assume that the case feature of the verb complement is speciﬁed to what
is cataloged as the dative case in morphology in Russian. But some verbs require a different
morphological case, so we allow the case value to depend on some individual diacritics of the
verb in order to be able to state this inherent case. In both cases verbs assign case. An assigned
case is structural, if it is assigned by a probe deﬁned by reference to a structural position. A
case is lexical if it is assigned by a probe which is a head. In the broader sense lexical case is
also structural, so we do not care much about the terminology.
At the point when all case features have got a value, the
 -features of all their probes have
been deleted under feature identity (not necessarily feature value identity). The phonological
representation of the the syntactic object in which all Agree operations have been effected can
be dispatched to the phonological component, if the object is of a category which allows this.
The net effect is simply that this syntactic object is unavailable for further syntactic operations.
We do not think that the theory of case assignment under agreement is complete. According
to this theory case is assigned by a verb to its direct and indirect objects, though neither the
direct nor the indirect objects in Russian agree with the verb in gender or number. Moreover,
we have to postulate two sets of agreement features for the verb to account for the case of the
two objects, and one set to account for the morphologically and phonetically realized agreement
with the subject. We will stick to this theory for deﬁniteness, nevertheless, but we would not,
in principle, exclude other possibilities of case assignment than under agreement. To avoid the
proliferation of formal invisible agreement sets by themselves we will package them into the
theory of selection.
Syntactic objects are also constructed by applications of the operation Move which is does what
itpromises: itcopiesaconstituenttosomeotherplace. One– perhapsthe– reasonformovement
is to satisfy
 
 
 
 
  which would cause the syntactic object to be non-well-formed (the derivation
of this object to crash) otherwise.
We will now deﬁne some ingredients to make this exposition more concrete. The deﬁnitions
follow Frish (1995).
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Feature structures are objects which are described by a grammar. We therefore distinguish be-
tween the features and their descriptions in the grammar. This distinction is similar to the one
between numbers and their (possibly abstract) representations. The feature structures of a gram-
mar are constructed from the features
F and the values
V. A feature structure is basically a
ﬁnite tree in which each arc is labeled by a feature, each leaf is labeled by a value, and no node
has two outgoing arcs with the same label. Viewed from a different angle, a feature structure
consists of paths. A path is either a value or a pair,
 
 
 
  where
  is a feature and
  a path;
note that there always must be a value, which may be unspeciﬁed, though, in the description of
the feature structure. In this case we write
 , using a variable, as if the feature structure itself
had variable value. A path
 
 
1
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  is usually written as
 
 
1
 
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
℄.
A feature structure
  is a ﬁnite set of paths such that if
 
 
1
 
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
℄ and
 
 
1
 
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
℄ are
members of
 , then
 
 
 , and
 
 
 
0. In other words, a feature structure cannot contain
two paths of the kind, e. g.
 
 
1
 
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
℄ and
 
 
1
 
2
 
0
℄. It also cannot contain two paths
that are identical except that they terminate with different values. Thus we might have a fea-
ture structure
 
 
f
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
℄
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
℄
 
 


 
 
 
 




℄
g. We can also have a description
 
0
 
f
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
℄
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
℄
 
 


 
 
 
 
℄
g, in which case thesyntacticobject which contains
this feature structure has no phonetic realization. Feature structure
  displayed as a tree is given
in (19). For typographical reasons the bullets at a node denote outgoing arcs from left to right,
and the label of an arc is displayed to the left of its bullet.
(19) case
￿agr
￿
acc num
￿per
￿
sing 3
Agreement in Russian also includes gender. Therefore we may assume that a case-bearing
feature structure has a subpath (20).
(20) case
￿stat
￿agr
￿
 
  num
￿per
￿gen
￿
 
 
 
where
 
2
f
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
g,
 
2
f
 
 
 
 
 
g,
 
2
f
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
g,
 
2
f
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
g.
In implementing the operations we could take deletion of features literally, hence resort to the
algorithmic speciﬁcation of syntactic structures. But to facilitate presentation we would like to
give static descriptions and therefore assume a special feature called stat, as in (20), which re-
ﬂects the statusof agr, i. e. whether the
 -features are active,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
℄ or deleted
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
℄.
It will also reﬂect the status of selectional requirements, i. e. whether they are satisﬁed or not.
To account for the selection of syntactic objects to trigger Merge we introduce the feature select
together with the feature stat to indicate the status of a selectional requirement which will be
one of the characteristics of the selecting category, much like in categorial grammar. We see
ourselves forced to make an additional assumptionlater to avoid the proliferation of agr features
in the verb we talked about. We assume that heads can select two elements at most, perhaps for
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reasons of conceptual structuring of information contained in the semantics of heads, perhaps
for some other reasons. And we assume two general kinds of selection, one of which is further
subdividesin two. A selectormayeither select acategory (categorialselectionorc-selection)or
require the presence of case in the selected element, in which case we call it agreement selection
(a-selection), since case is a reﬂection of agreement in this fragment, cf. (21).
(21)
 
 
 select
￿
 
 
 
stat
￿
 
 
￿
  case
￿agr
￿
 
 
C-selection requires there to be some nominal category, e. g. the requirement only speciﬁes a
variable
  asavalueof
 
 -branch. Agreementselectionworkstoselectcase-bearing elements,
perhaps with a particular case form requirement. This is needed because there are two options
available in general. If the description of the selector contains
  as the value of case of the
selected category, we have structural case which we will sometimes call lexical, if it is required
by a lexical category. If this value is speciﬁed outright as a requirement of the selector we have
an idiosyncratic case. To reﬂect this we must be able to refer to the lexicon entry of the selector,
and specify the case form in this lexicon entry. Thus, e. g. (22) is the structure for the verb
’izbegat’ (avoid) and the lexicon should specify that it requires genitive. From here we will
switch to the standard notation for feature structures, to facilitate presentation.
(22)
"
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h
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#
#
Consider idiosyncratic case in more detail. If the selectional requirement is satisﬁed by
 
 
 
 
 ,
the status ﬂag of the selector is set to
 , i. e.
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
℄. The
 -set of the goal is then
considered inactive because of the status ﬂag of the selector, also reﬂected by the fact that the
case value of the goal is set to the value required by the verb. This is a kind of agreement, so we
would like agr-matching to accompany this kind of selection. The other option, that of lexical
case, with
  as the value of case in the selectional requirement, assigns a structural case to the
selected object. Again, since case is assigned we have a kind of agreement and therefore should
require that agr be present in the selector. But in both cases this is not the
  set of the verb itself
which is involved, but a selection path.
For categorial selection, cf (23), case is not required.
(23)
"
 
 
 
 


 
"
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
#
#
This has some consequences. Since there is no case feature in this selectional requirement,
the status of agr in the selected element cannot be changed via this selectional requirement.
This selector feature does not allow the selector to assign case. Since case is not assigned to
the selected case-bearing object under this option, it must get case assigned only as a reﬂex of
agr-deletion under
 
 
 
 
 , The latler may become operative after Move has applied.
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We now have a mechanism to treat case assignment by verbs which select two objects. If a verb
selects an indirect object as well as a direct one, it has two selector paths, one with a-selection,
the other with c-selection, and a set of nominal agr features. This set is then responsible for the
case assignment to the c-selected syntactic object.
Under c-selection, if no set of nominal agr features is present in the selector, the object must be
moved somewhere, where it can get case assigned. Therefore we also need the option of case
assignment which occurs under agreement due to movement when the selector has agr of its
own, but the selected object is in the minimal domain of
 
 
 
 
 , and not the sister of the probe.
This seems to be relevant in cases when agr on the selector is necessary to drive movement of
one selected item and at the same time the selector selects another item, which constitutes the
domain of the moved element. We will consider this case when we discuss the nature of
 
 
 
category in the next section.
We will call both a-selectors and objects with agr features which c-select a nominal element
case assigners and consider them to be the only source of case in this paper. We have thus three
options to account for the instrumental case in Russian: either it is a structural case assigned
under selection, or it is assigned under agreement, or it is an inherent case. We may safely
discard the latter possibility in most cases, however. Whenever the instrumental is idiosyncratic,
it does not mark the construction which we characterize as secondary predication. That leaves
two options: instrumental case is assigned under c-selection by a case assigner which has agr
features or it is assigned under a-selection.
Thus, a selector is a possible structural case assigner, if it c-selects a nominal category and has
nominal agreement or it a-selects a case-bearing element. In the former case one part of the
feature structure is (24).
(24)
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In the latter case, since we assumed that verbs may be selectors with an a-selectional require-
ment, verbs with an indirect object in structural case must have (25).
(25)
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The status of this agr together with case in such a probe is set to
  with the status of selectional
requirement. And the selected category gets the structural case associated with the verb, which
we may assume to be dativecase. The c-selected object merged with the verb (direct object) gets
its case value assigned under agreement with the nominal agr of the verb, if it is present and the
latter is then deleted. Note the asymmetry of the two case assignments: a satisﬁed a-selectional
requirement does not render the object syntactically inactive, deleting all agr does. Thus, if a-
selectional requirement is not met when the nominal agr of the verb is deleted, the object is not
well-formed, but is syntactically inactive as a selector for merge. Thus, lexical or idiosyncratic
case is to be assigned prior to the second structural case of the verb. Note that we have two
different kinds of grammatical relations here differentiated via different kinds of selection, since
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the
 
 
  feature in the selection requirement does not warrant closing off the projection for the
needs of syntax.
Verbs are one kind of case assigner. Another kind is a functional category which probes for
a case-bearing element as well as selects it, i. e. it has its own nominal agr-probe and a c-
selectional requirement. Then case is deleted in the goal as a reﬂex of agreement, perhaps
under movement. A common assumption about such categories are that there are at least two
functional categories, say
  and
 6, which probe for case and c-select a nominal category, as
well as a-select another category from which the nominal category which gets no case there
assigned is moved. The morphological case form assigned under agreement with
  is called
nominativecase. Since we do not intend to contribute to the status of the theoretical controversy
about different kinds of functional heads, we will assume that the present state of research does
not allow us to specify these categories satisfactorily, so we do not place much weight on their
exact characteristics. We shall assume that there is a case assigned under agreement with the
verb which is called accusativecase. We will also reserve theterm ’direct object’ forthe nominal
element which is assigned this case. As noted, we also assume that the complement of the verb,
if selected, gets dative assigned under selection. We will call it indirect object.
Some remarks are necessary about the agreement between verbs and sentential subjects. Since
ﬁnite verbs agree with the subject of the sentence (in the more traditional senses of the terms)
in number, person and gender (in the past tense) in Russian, we assume that this morphological
marking reﬂects the head-adjunction movement of
 
0 (verb) to
 
0. The new complex syntactic
object
f
 
0
 
 
0
g picks up the agreement which is then manifest on the verb. We will not consider
the mechanism of this movement here.
This sketch provides general views on case assignment and selection, but no concrete case as-
signer for the instrumental in the secondary predication structures as yet, to which we now turn.
2.2 Case assigners for SP in Russian
We will proceed on the following assumption of categorial uniformity:
Categorial Uniformity of SP
A secondary predication is a uniform clause-like predication structure which is a
projection of a functional head.
The instrumental case of secondary predicates in this SP-clause will be a lexical
structural case assigned by this functional head.
We were guided in our choice of the small clause SP constituent by the hypothesis by Bowers
(1993)7. According to him any English sentence has at least one (in which case it is primary)
functional predicative constituent, as in (26). This constituent introduces the subject of the
sentence, which therefore is selected not by the verb, but by the new functional head. The verb
phrase is also selected by this functional head. Bowers uses
  to select this phrasal constituent
in the cited paper, and
  in Bowers (2001). We shall keep the notation of the corresponding
examples.
6For the latter, see Larson (1988)
7His use of the terms primary predication and secondary predication in the Appendix of the paper does not
coincide with ours!
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(26) IP
NP I
0
I
0 PrP
NP Pr
0
Pr
0 XP
The XP constituent in this scheme, which we will call the predicate of the predication structure
can be any majorconstituentwith head in V, A, N, P, according to Bowers. Similarproposals ofa
functional projection selected by another functional head and selecting a verb phrase were made
by Collins (Collins, 1997, his term is Tr) and Kratzer (Kratzer, 1996, with the voice category).
A simple copula sentence like (27) could have a partial syntactic structure like in (28), ignoring
the status of the copula be. We shifted from NP to DP.
(27) [ [ John ]
  [ was
 
  a janitor. ]]
(28) IP
John
(copy)
I
0
I
0
PAST
PrP
DP
John
(orig)
Pr
0
Pr
0 DP
a janitor
If there are more than two predicative constituents, the second one is a secondary predicate.
Secondary predicates have thus the structure like in (29).
(29) PrP
DP Pr
0
Pr
0 AP/DP/PP
We have stillto specify thethe exact syntacticsite at which secondary predication phrase occurs,
the nature of the subject of the secondary predication phrase and the relation between the host
(i. e. subject of the secondary predication) and the subject of the predication phrase.
Depictive secondary predicates are treated in Bowers (2001) as small clause adjuncts with dif-
ferent adjunction sites. The sentence (30) with the subject-oriented depictive predication (SOD)
gets the relevant structure in (32), sentence (31) with the object-oriented depictive predication
(OOD) that in (33).
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(30) John walked angry.
(31) John drank the coffee cold.
(32) PrP
PrP
DP
John
Pr
0
Pr
0 VP
V
0
walk
PrP
DP Pr
0
Pr
0 AP
angry
(33) PrP
DP
John
Pr
0
Pr
0 VP
DP
the coffee
V
0
V
0
V
0
drink
PrP
DP Pr
0
Pr
0 AP
cold
Hans-Martin Gaertner pointed out to us in a personal communication that among other argu-
ments in favor of the adjunct analysis of depictive predicates rather than arguments we could
count the impossibility of extraction from them. This behavior patterns with the behavior of
adjuncts in general, cf. (34).
(34) a. What did you consider John angry about?
b. *What did John walk angry about?
The difference between the SOD and OOD depictives is usually taken to be shown by tests of
stranding, e. g. (35) (Rothstein, 2000).
(35) a. What Mary did was paint the house drunk
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b. What Mary did drunk was paint the house
c. What Mary did was drink the coffee hot
d. *What Mary did hot was drink the coffee
And similarly for resultatives:
(36) a. What Mary did was paint the house red
b. *What Mary did red was paint the house
Resultativesareusuallysubdividedintoweakand strong,cf. (Kaufmannand Wunderlich,1998).
Weak resultativeshavea secondary predicate which characterizes theresultingstateof theobject
of the verb, strong resultatives characterize the state of an argument which only is acceptable in
the secondary predication construction and the verb is not subcategorized for it in the normal
environment. Weak resultatives, e. g. (37), receive the structure in (38), strong resultatives, e. g.
(39), that in (40), according to Bowers8.
(37) John watered the tulips ﬂat.
(38) PrP
DP
John
Pr
0
Pr
0 VP
DP
the tulips
V
0
V
0
water
PrP
DP Pr
0
Pr
0 AP
ﬂat
(39) John ran his Nikes threadbare.
8A very similar approachfor Chinese is advocatedby Zhang (2001),except that
P
r of Bowers is taken to be the
small
v. The consequences of this distinction for the intended semantics are unclear at present, so we will follow
Bowers.
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(40) PrP
DP
John
Pr
0
Pr
0 VP
DP
 
his Nikes
V
0
V
0
run
PrP
 
  Pr
0
Pr
0 AP
threadbare
Thus, we will adopt this secondary predication structure for Russian as a starting point, but
with one amendment. We assume that SOD SP has the structure in (41), where the secondary
predication structure is adjoined below the maximal
 
 
 -projection, and not to it.
(41) PrP
DP
John
Pr
0
Pr
0
Pr
0 VP
V
0
walk
PrP
DP Pr
0
Pr
0 AP
angry
We can now investigate the possibility of assigning instrumental case to SP in these structures
following Bailyn (1995) and Bailyn and Citko (1999). These are two similar proposals to treat
secondary predication in Russian based on Bowers. Russian does not have the resultative inter-
pretation of SP, but does have depictive predicates. The
 
 - or a
 
 -predicate is either in the
instrumental or has the case congruent to that of its host9. Bailyn assumes the structure proposed
by Bowers and suggests that the instrumental case is assigned by the
 
 
0 head of the predicate
phrase to a case-bearing predicate.
9A host of the secondary predicate is that constituent which is its subject, intuitively. This term is not intended
to be theoretically deﬁned.
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(42) IP
DPnom
 
 
 
I
I
0
I
0 PrP
Spec
 
 
Pr
0
Pr
0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
found
VP
DPacc
 
 
 
him
V
0
V
0
V
0
t
 
PrP
Spec
PRO
 
Pr
0
Pr
0 APinstr
 
0
 
 
 
 
 
drunk
It is obviously necessary to specify, whether
 
  a-selects the predicate (via some syntactic
feature covering only semantic predicates) or c-selects and agrees with it, because it has agr.
We shall discuss the alternative in the section on case alternation (section 2.3), and discuss the
status of the subject of
 
 
  ﬁrst. Before this, we would like to show that such structures already
possess some explanatory capacity.
Note that a possible indirect object would be located as a sister to
 
0. Now there is a restriction
ontheuseofsecondarypredicates inRussian: ifapredicateispredicatedofanexplicitlyrealized
host, the host is preferably the subject or the direct object in the matrix sentence (Nichols, 1981,
p. 68 ff.). Nichols (1982) contains a thorough description of this constraint for what was called
Type 4 secondary predication, which sometimes allow marginally acceptable indirect object
controllers. There she also assumes that this structure manifests the same relation of control as,
e. g. the null subject of the inﬁnitive and its matrix-clause antecedent. This assumption is made
by Bowers, too and we will follow, but with some reservations. Assume for the moment with
Bowers that the status of DP in the secondary PrP is a phonetically null PRO-noun controlled
from the primary predication structure, either by the subject (SpecPrP) or by the secondary
subject (i. e. direct object, SpecVP) (this will be subject to a small modiﬁcation below). It
is commonly assumed that the controller of
 
 
  should be a c-commanding element. If so,
we immediately obtain the syntactic restriction of the use of depictive SP: neither the oblique
object, which is a sister to
 
0, nor the
 
  in the prepositional phrase are able to control
 
 
 .
The proposal that depictives are in general small clauses with a PRO-subject dates back at least
to Hornstein and Lightfoot (1987). Winkler (1997) criticized it, but inconclusively so, in our
opinion, which brings us back to the status of the subject of SP.
Russian also exhibits embedded ﬁnite sentences with phonetically unrealized subjects which are
claimed to have an empty pronominal pro in subject position, cf. (43) (Lindseth, 1998).
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(43) On zameˇ cal ˇ cto pro dumaet o nej postojanno
He realized-iterative that pro thinks about her constantly
He kept realizing that he was constantly thinking about her
Though the status of the Russian language within the theoretical framework seems to differ
from pro-drop languages like both Italian or Croatian, it seems that some phonologically empty
(pro)nominal category is indeed necessary. And, following Borer (1989) and Huang (1989,
1992, fn. 2) we would not distinguish between PRO and pro as between fundamentally different
entities, although wecontinueto use theterminologyofthe quotationswhere necessary. We thus
consider the null subject of a small clause and the null subject of a null-subject ﬁnite sentence
in Russian to be fundamentally the same element, different properties being supplied by the
context. We will follow Huang (1992) and call it
 
 
 . Both Franks and Hornstein (1992)
and Huang (1992) seem to envisage the small clause with the PRO or resp.
 
 
  subject as
an explication of the notion of controlled predicate, i. e. a predicate, for which the choice
of a subject referent is not entirely free, but is not rigidly ﬁxed by the governing functional
category either. The term controlled predicate is ours, and is not intended to be theoretically
important, though. Still, to answer the question about the relation between the host and the
secondary predicate, we shouldnotethat
 
 
 -controlis not usuallysupposed to coverthe hosts
of secondary predicates in (15l) or (15m), for example. However, since we do not distinguish
between
 
 
  and
 
 
 , we will assume that in Russian implicit controllers of
 
 
  are possible,
if they are consistent with the syntactic constraints. We will provide a tentative formalization of
this implicit control in section 4.2.2.
Consider now the hypothesis of Bowers/Bailyn from the standpoint of the our formalization of
a piece of the minimalist program somewhat closer. As suggested, the instrumental case should
be assigned by the predicate head
 
 
0, i.e. it is a lexical structural case in our terminology. Now,
 
  should have two selectional requirements: one for its subject, and one for its complement.
The two paths should differ in their characteristics: one is a-selection, one is c-selection. In
the second case there must be a nominal agreement on
 
 . But nominal agreement on
 
  is
undesirable, since
 
  should not assign case to its subject. Its subject must either move, as
in ﬁnite sentences, or get its agreement features deleted by some kind of anaphoric agreement
under control in controlled secondary predication structures.
Three options of assigning case to the complement of
 
  are possible in principle: (a)
 
 
0
selectsapredicatepluscase(i. e. a-selectsit), eithersemanticallyorsyntactically; (b)itc-selects
its predicate without agreeing with it; (c) it c-selects and agrees with the predicate, because it
has its own nominal agr feature. We should bear in mind that
 
  may also select a ﬁnite verbal
predicate in primary predication, and then should not possess the nominal agr. Let us consider
these options in more detail.
Suppose a predicate is selected and its case assigned as a result of a-selection, i. e. option (a).
This selection might be syntactic or semantic. Syntactic selection could refer to categorial fea-
tures of the complement. Syntactic selection would imply that the selector requires a syntactic
category which is semantically a predicate. It seems futile to introduce such a category into syn-
tax. We could therefore assume semantic selection, i. e. that there is a special syntactic feature
which is interpreted as a kind of schema summarizing the type of predicates cross categorially,
i. e. any category which can be used as a predicate gets this syntactic feature.
 
  requires such
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a feature and also requires case to be present, if a nominal category is selected10 which is then
structural instrumental. This option rules out ﬁnite verbs and inﬁnitives in SP, since they have
no case. Let us call this version nominal selection hypothesis. We must assume two
 
 -heads,
however, one selecting verbal predicates, and one selecting nominal, case-bearing predicates.
Consider option (b), i. e. c-selection without agr in
 
 . Since agr is not mentioned in the
selectional requirement of
 
 , agr of the nominal or adjectival SP is not deleted, hence case not
assigned, thought the selectional requirement is satisﬁed. A nominal predicate, if selected, has
to move somewhere else to get case assigned. We thus have no way to obtain the instrumental
from
 
  under this option.
Consider now option (c), under which case in the goal is assigned as a result of agreement with
the probe in
 
 . We must assume nominal agreement features for
 
 
0 in SP-clauses. Therefore
case assignment is a consequence of agreement. Moreover,
 
 
0 c-selects a predicate it agrees
with. This assumption seems to conform to the Bowers/Bailyn hypothesis. A
 
  which has
agr and selects a predicate in small clauses would also exclude ﬁnite verbs and inﬁnitives from
the position as the complement of
 
 
0 in SP, since the agr-features of the probe would remain
undeleted. Call this option the Pr-agr hypothesis, for future reference. Note that here, too, we
are forced to assume two variants of
 
 , one with agr, the other without.
Remember that there is also the requirement for
 
  to select its subject, but not to assign case
to it11. Note that if
 
  has agreement it can in principle assign case to its subject instead of the
complement. Since this would mean that its complement remains without case, it should move
to get its case assigned. Either there are constraints which prohibit this movement, hence the
complement must use the
 
 -agreement, or this hypothesis is untenable.
While both (a) and (c) accounts may describe the assignment of the instrumental, they both face
a problem. This major problem is the occurrence of congruent case forms in the position of an
adjectival secondary predicate12. In subject-oriented depictives (SOD) the secondary predicate
may occur in the nominative,in object-oriented depictives(OOD) it may occur in the accusative,
cf (44) where (44a) is SOD and (44b) is OOD.
(44) a. on vypil ˇ caj sonnym/sonnyj
he drank the tea-acc sleepy-instr/nom
sleepy, he drank up the tea
b. snaˇ cala maˇ sinu vzveˇ sivajut pustuju/
?pustoj
ﬁrst the truck-acc weigh empty-acc/instr
ﬁrst they weigh the truck empty
This case assignment is called congruent case. Neither (a) nor (c) can pinpoint the source of the
congruent case and of the alternation in general as yet.
2.3 The instrumental vs. congruent case alternation in Russian
To analyze this problem we should determine the case assigner in the congruent case construc-
tions and the constraints which might show up in their distribution properties. Nichols (1981)
10For non-nominal categories like
P
P the selectional requirement for case should be void, since they need no
case to be assigned.
11We must consider this as a description of the state of things, without offering an explanation for it.
12Nouns invariably get instrumental here.
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did a great job of collecting and investigating the material to identify the distribution constraints
on either the congruent from, or on the instrumental. Though there are many such constraints,
one lesson could be drawn from her investigation immediately: there might not be a single ex-
planation of the distribution. Of particular interest in this respect is the observation that among
the adjective-SPs in singular there are preferences based on syntactic features, though it is often
claimed that the relevant distinction is of semantic nature. Feminine singular predicates favor
the congruent form, masculine singular favor the instrumental, cf. (45), which occurs on p. 151
of Nichols (1981).
(45) a. on otpravils’a v put’
?veselyj/veselym
he set off in way happy-nom/instr
he set off on his way happy
b. ona otpravilas’ v put’ veselaja/
?veseloj
she set off in way happy-nom/instr
she set off on her way happy
c. snaˇ cala maˇ sinu vzveˇ sivajut pustuju/
?pustoj
ﬁrst the truck-acc-fem weigh empty-acc/instr
ﬁrst they weigh the truck empty
d. snaˇ cala grusovik vzveˇ sivajut
?pustoj/pustym
ﬁrst the truck-acc-mask weigh empty-acc/instr
ﬁrst they weigh the truck empty
But probably the task of ﬁnding a case assigner for the congruent form could be taken up re-
gardless of distribution factors at ﬁrst.
Both under the nominal selection hypothesis (a) and the Pr-agr hypothesis (c) we must assume
two
 
 -heads. We will assume Pr-agr as a working hypothesis, hence assume that movement
of the complement of
 
  is impossible for some reason, but in principle we could assume the
nominal selection hypothesis as well.
Now,
 
  selects a predicate. We sometimes require it to have
 -features, and sometimes require
itnottohavethem. Itisnotallowedtohavethem,iftheselectedpredicateisﬁnite
 
 ,otherwise
they would remain undeleted. It is required to have them, if the instrumental case assignment is
to work.
The existence of two or more syntactic options in a language is a bifurcation point, seen devel-
opmentally. Such a point may start two potential lines of language development. If they occur
in the same position, these lines could drift apart for the two
 
 -variants to become associated
with different implicatures (picking up some pragmatic load) or even different semantics. But
for a period of time it could be expected there to be no consistency in exploiting these options,
either semantically or pragmatically. If we assume this to be the case with Russian
 
 , we could
be able to pinpoint the source of the variability of preferences in the case assignment. If there is
a non-
 - version of
 
  in Russian, it could be present in the SP-constructions alternating with
the
 - version there, and we expect that it will presumably have a varying pragmatic or other
preference load.
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What are then the consequences of the existence of both the
  and the non-
  versions of
 
  in
Russian in the SP-construction and how could this distinction help us to solve the problem of
congruent case assignment?
We assume that SP-PrP is in some sense anaphoric on the main clause. This anaphoricity is
manifest in three respects. First, no copula is allowed to be present in SP-PrP. Second, SP-PrP
has only a very restricted temporal interpretation which is relative to that of the main clause.
Third, SP-PrP cannot have an overt pronominal subject, e. g. (46) is impossible.
(46) *Petr
  xodit [on
  zlym]
Peter
  walks [he
  angry]
Peter walks angry
We take these properties to be a conﬁrmation that SP-PrP has no
 
  embedding it. Now,
suppose we have an agr-less
 
 
 . Then there is no way for the predicate to get case assigned.
We propose that this agr-less
 
  is responsible for the congruent case assignment. However,
this proposal is very tentative and should be given further thought to.
Russian is at present in a state in which it often allows case congruence in the primary predica-
tion structures, e. g. in copula sentences with marked tense, cf. (47), which sometimes alternate
with the instrumental case.
(47) a. on byl interesnyj sobesednik
he-nom was interesting conversation partner-nom
he was interesting to talk to
b. on byl interesnym sobesednikom
he-nom was interesting conversation partner-instr
he was an interesting conversation partner
Whatever the mechanism of the congruent case assignment to the primary predicate is operative
here, we might expect it to be operative in SP-structures as well. For primary predication we
might assume that if
 
  has no nominal
 -features the predicate gets its
 -features deleted by
some mechanism with reference to the subject of the predication phrase. In this mechanism
which operates in contexts of primary predication
 
 
  serves as a case transmitter. We expect
it to serve the same function in SP-PrP, too. The difference is that the subject in primary pred-
ication (e.g. (28) gets its nominative case assigned by
 , whereas there is no
  in SP, and the
subject of the
 
 
 -phrase must get its case from somewhere else.
Therefore we assume that the predicate in SP-PrP will get the case of the antecedent of the
subject of
 
 
 , which we have to provide ﬁrst. Note that the structures in (32) and (33) have
theseantecedentsalignedin thepositionwheretheycan control
 
 
 . So ifwepostulatethat
 
 
 
must anaphorically agree with whatever probe of the antecedent it may agree, we can compute
the congruent case via the agreement chain. The ﬁnite
 
 s and the inﬁnitivals are still barred
from SP-position in secondary predication, because there is no
 , hence there is no way to check
the verbal
 
 
  part of the
 
 .
There is an alternative proposal of congruent case assignment made in Bailyn (2001). It dif-
fers from our in that it envisages that the complement of
 
  in SP-
 
 
  moves to get case
to the position as a second speciﬁer of the category which contains the antecedent of
 
 
  in
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our terminology. This proposal, being very close to ours in essence, differs in assuming a very
unsurface-like word order. Consequently, some stylisticmovementoperation must be postulated
to get rid of it. Thus, nominative would be assigned both to the moved secondary predicate
 
 
 
and to the subject
 
 
  in the structure (48) by
 
0
 
 
0.
(48) TP/vP
DP(AP)
  TP/vP
DP
  T
0/v
0
T
0/v
0 VP
t
 
PrP
t
 
Our version relies on the notion of the anaphoric case assignment, hence has no need of undoing
movement.
To sum up the syntactic developments up to now: though some details are fairly difﬁcult to
spell out, some properties of Russian SPs are explainable, if a sufﬁciently interesting notion of
anaphoricity can be developed. But there is one more point to be accounted for.
Asnoted,thereisyetanotherinterestingrestrictiononSP: thealternationinstrumental/congruent
case is impossible for nouns as SPs. Thus, (49a,49b,50b) are acceptable, whereas (50b) is not.
(49) a. on vernuls’a domoj ustalym
he-nom returned home tired-instr
He came back home tired
b. on vernuls’a domoj direktorom
he-nom returned home director-instr
He came back home a director
(50) a. on vernuls’a domoj ustalyj
he-nom returned home tired-nom
He came back home tired
b. *on vernuls’a domoj direktor
he-nom returned home director-npm
He came back home a director
Since there is case-form alternation on nouns in primary predication, it seems that there is some
property of the constructionwhich is relevant here, and not thedifference between nouns and ad-
jectives per se. The observation could be accommodated, if we assume that SPs based on nouns
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do not have special features relevant to aspect in Russian, whereas those based on adjectives do
have them. This assumptions needs more elaboration though.
Some linguists assume that there is a special functional projection, which they call
 
 
  for as-
pect, and which isthelocusofaspectual semanticsofthesentence. Do weneed sucha projection
for Russian? It seems that assumingthis projection for Englishmakes sense, if we accommodate
progressive and perfect tense forms in it. Both forms are analytic in English. There is no overt
manifestation of aspect via analytic forms in Russian, though. Russian displays a wide variety
of preﬁxation instead which usually is assumed to play a role similar to that of English analytic
constructions, cf. Wade (1992). Thus, though the idea that aspectual properties might be coded
for semantic selection is interesting, its implementation for Russian should probably be differ-
ent. We assume that Russian does not have a separate head
 
 
 , but it has aspectual features on
the verb, so that in Russian
 
  is marked for aspect even though there is no separate functional
head associated with aspectual semantics.
In assuming this we adopted the hypothesis that
￿ congruent case forms are associated with the absence of
 
 
  on
 
 ,
￿ this version of
 
  categorially selects a predicate.
￿ Since in general this seems to be the version associated with verbal predicates we might
also assume that is has the aspectual feature which must be matched by agreement.
￿ if adjectives (and participles) are also endowed with this feature, but nouns are not, we
have the corollary that nouns are not eligible for congruent case, but only for the instru-
mental in SP, whereas adjectives (and participles) are.
￿ With primary predication the situation is different: the copula manifests that
 
  has an
inactive aspectual feature, irrespective of the predicate. This seems plausible, provided a
corresponding semantics of the copula.
A major problem for the whole framework of assumptions presented so far is the semantics of
the proposed construction. We will now proceed with the formulation of the general approach
to context-dependent semantics, and its application to SP-structures.
3 The semantics of SP in Russian: general issues
In this section we will ﬁrst sketch some general ides of the context-dependent semantics which
we intend to use, and then proceed by making more speciﬁc assumptions for the case of sec-
ondary predication. The move is dictated by our conviction that a semantics which depends on
the context is the proper approach to phenomena involving all kind of grammatically relevant
anaphoricity.
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3.1 Inference in semantics
It is rather well known that a word can be used to refer to any number of things by the processes
of metaphor and metonymy. It is not plausible that all of them are available in each context,
where the listenerhas to arriveat a singleinterpretationof a structure. This is an old observation,
and Br´ eal (1887, p.141) is an early attempt to sort out these ideas: ”It will be asked, how it
is that these meanings do not thwart each other; but we must remember that each time the
words are placed in surroundings which predetermine their import. We are not even troubled to
suppress the other meanings of the word: these meanings do not exist for us, they do not cross
the threshold of our consciousness. It is bound to be so, since happily the association of ideas is
for most men based on essentials of things, and not on the sound”.
Note thedouble-sided roleof thecontext. Thecontext is to providean amountof informationfor
the interpretation on the one side (association of ideas), and to help to weed out the implausible
interpretations from this limited amount on the other. The whole task of integrating the contex-
tual information into the meaning of the word and ﬁltering out the implausible interpretations
can be viewed as an instance of inference. The distinguishing feature of this view is the use of
plausibleinference on structures in propositionalformat instead of computationson general data
structures. The context both provides the resources for inference and evaluates the plausibility
of the solution. Note that this might be simply a proﬁtable perspective on a range of phenomena
regardless of whether some particular data structures and algorithms on them are used. This is
the stance taken here.
Inference is a process of transition from premises to conclusions codiﬁed in the form of rules.
If a rule takes us to true consequences on the assumption that its premises are true every time it
is used, the rule is sound. Sound forms of inference are not context-dependent, so, for instance,
sound deductive rules are valid in any context, if valid in one particular context. Other forms of
inference are not sound, yet are often claimed to be part and parcel of the human mental activity.
Hypothetical inference is among these. We adopt hypotheses to explain observations, and their
adoption, considered as inference rule, is not a sound rule, since hypotheses may turn out to be
false, given new observations.
The main characteristics of hypothetical or assumption based reasoning is that we use ordinary
logic to conduct it. We adopt hypotheses from which out observations follow by ordinary logic.
But these adopted assumptions must be canceled, if their consequences lead to conﬂicts with
facts. Inference of this kind is more like guess-work. Different hypotheses as well as different
criteria determining which of them may be used are possible. The fundamental criterion remains
that the use of hypotheses should not lead to irresolvable conﬂicts. A conﬂict is usually an
outright inconsistency, but other similar notions are relevant, too. The choices of values of all
these parameters give rise to different systems of reasoning. One more parameter of variation,
relevant to formal languages only, is the expressive power of the language in which reasoning is
conducted.
There are different uses of hypothetical reasoning. It can be used to explain observations, e.g.
when we hypothesize that it has rained, if we come into the yard and see that the grass is wet.
We can use hypothetical reasoning to predict situations, e.g. when we assume that the car we
came to the ofﬁce by is still at the place where we left it. We use it to contemplate alternatives,
e.g. saying things like ”If I were a carpenter, and you in my shoes..., you...”. We could also
use it to codify new knowledge given some observations, e.g. when we assume that all swans
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are white, having observed a number of white swans, but no swan of a different color. The
knowledge thus codiﬁed can be used in its turn for the tasks mentioned above.
We may consider establishing the meaning of words and sentences represented as propositional
structures to stand in the relation of interpretation
 
 
  between these and syntactic structures.
In a theory of semantic interpretation based on hypothetical reasoning
 
 
  is considered to be
established by hypothetical inference. The inference can be described as assuming an appro-
priate piece of conceptual knowledge for the sake of explaining some more abstract linguistic
structures. We will call these structures semantic forms. A semantic form is deduced from the
conceptual knowledge which we hypothetically adopt as relevant. In current terminology this
would be an instance of abductive inference (abduction). Hence, our theory postulates that
 
 
 
is based on abductive inference. If semantic forms are directly associated with some phrasal
syntactic structures we have the induced relation of interpretation of these structures. If some
of these semantic forms are associated with words, we interpret words. Using abduction to do
lexical interpretation is the basic idea behind the project reported on in this paper. The idea is
not new, and the project can draw upon some previous work.
Abduction as one of the basic forms of reasoning alongside with deduction and induction ﬁrst
ﬁgured prominently in the works of Peirce (Peirce, 1931-1958, for example). In (Peirce, 1992,
Lecture 2) Charles Saunders Peirce provided a short, essential characteristic of this inference
form:
(51) Still more convenient is the following conditional form of statement:
If
  were true,
 
 
 
0
 
 
0
0 would follow as miscellaneous consequences.
But
 
 
 
0
 
 
0
0 are in fact true
.
 . Provisionally, we may suppose that
  is true.
This kind of reasoning is often called adopting a hypothesis for the sake of its explanation
of known facts. The explanation is the modus ponens
If
  is true,
 
 
 
0
 
 
0
0 are true
  is true
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
 
 
0
0 are true
The role of hypothetical reasoning in theory formation in natural sciences, e.g. in physics, is
undisputed. Its usefulness as a mechanism of interpretation in natural-language based commu-
nication seems also to be acknowledged. The ﬁrst extensive formal proposal to use abduction
to model language comprehension was made in Charniak and McDermott (1985). The prob-
lem complex involved in text understanding discussed by the authors concerned hypothetically
inferring plans underlying the narrative with the aim to infer more information than the literal
meaning of the sentence in the narrative, speech act recognition, resolving the reference of pro-
nouns and deﬁnite descriptions, and word-sense disambiguation. The discussion amounted to
miscellaneoussuggestionsofwhatthealgorithmsdoingabductionfortheseproblemscould look
like, and indications of expected difﬁculties.
Thedifﬁcultiesin using abductionare considerable, and ifrecently a growthof interestin theuse
of abduction in linguistic theories could be noted, (e.g. Hobbs et al. (1993), McRoy and Hirst
(1995), Meyer-Klabunde (1995), Norvig and Wilensky (1993)), then probably as a consequence
of the growing popularity of hypothetical reasoning over the years in the ﬁeld of artiﬁcial intel-
ligence, where it is used in plan recognition, diagnosis and commonsense reasoning in general,
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cf. Konolige (1996). Abduction is seldom tractable computationally (Eshghi, 1993), but work
on inductive logic programming shows that such results can be fruitful, and not detrimental, cf.
Muggleton (1996)13.
We will brieﬂy discuss the general background of abductive reasoning an then lay out our as-
sumption about a theory of semantic interpretation by abduction.
3.1.1 Abduction as interpretation
Abductive reasoning is considered to be a kind of inference. We follow Genesereth and Nilsson
(1987), and describe inference as the process of obtaining conclusions from premises. Such a
process is taken to consist of small inference steps each of which is justiﬁed by some inference
rule. An inference rule consists of a set of sentence patterns called conditions in Genesereth and
Nilsson (1987), and another set of patterns called conclusions. Whenever there are sentences
which match the conditions of the rule we can infer sentences matching the conclusions. A rule
is sound, if any set of conditions logically implies any set of conclusions derived from these
conditions with the help of the rule. Deductive inference uses only sound rules, deﬁnitionally.
Consider now the case when some sentences match the patterns of the conclusions of the rule,
and we derive sentences which match the conditions of the rule. Under this kind of inference we
assume that we possibly deal with a more restricted set of models, than our observations tell us.
Exactly what set this is is a matter of speculation, if no additional information is available, since
there may be different sentences which match the pattern of conditions given the conclusions.
We do not introduce new rules of inference in addition to the sound rules used in deductive
inference, but change the use of these rules. Consider the case of modus ponens, (52).
(52)
 
 
!
 
 
Whenever we have
  and
 
!
 , the rule of modus ponens allows us to conclude
 . Suppose
we have
 . Due to the soundness of the rule used in the normal direction we know that
  implies
  relative to
 
!
 , so we may jump to a special case of the set of models satisfying
  by
assuming that we are confronted with its subset in which
  holds. This may be wrong, and
the rule of modus ponens used in reverse direction is not a sound rule, hence the inference is
not deductive. We simply consider
  to be an evidence that
  holds, because this would imply
 , given our knowledge that they are related, which is expressed by
 
!
 . So we make the
assumption that
  is the case.
The notion has a ﬂavor of explanation, since we kind of explain why
  holds, and the term has
become standard. It can be generalized using a formal deﬁnition of semantic entailment or of
proof. It is a technical notion and it cannot be taken as an adequate explication of general ideas
13Kautz et al. (1995) note that ”...abduction problems can be solved in polynomial time when the background
Horntheoryis representedby a set of characteristicmodels.”Theypointout an interestingperspective: ”...The fact
that abduction is hard for clausal Horn theories, but easy when the same background theory is represented by a set
of characteristic models, means that it may be difﬁcult to generate the characteristic models of a given Horn theory:
there may be exponentially many characteristic models, or even if there are few, they may be hard to ﬁnd. None
the less, it may be worth while to invest the effort to ”compile” a useful Horn theory into its set of characteristic
models, just in case the latter representation does indeed turn out to be of reasonable size. This is an example of
”knowledge compilation”.” These ideas may be relevant to the questions of semantics, too.
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on what kind of thing an explanation is. But even in this technical sense there are still degrees
of freedom in this deﬁnition. There may be different
  and
 
0 which have
 
 
 
0
 
 
0
0 as observed
consequences, but are not distinguished by them, and we would like to know, which hypothesis
is better. There are implicit constraints on what can be a hypothesis in a given context. We could
try to generalize Peirce’s proposal to other rules of inference to see the problem. Consider a
special case of modus ponens (53).
(53)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!
 
 
We can conceive
  as an indication that
 
 
  is the case. If we have no evidence that
  and
  are
somehowrelated, the assumption
 
 
  seems to be unwarranted. But if a numberof observations
established that
  is often accompanied by
 , then the reverse use of this instance of modus
ponens amounts to assuming that in the case under observation the situation is the same, though
we have no observed data on
 . The point here is context-dependence of the criteria of what
is a good assumption. Since
 
 
 
 
 
!
  is a tautology, we can always use modus ponens to
make the assumption that
 
 
 , given
 , but in some contexts it is a good hypothesis, in some
a less good one. If I see an unknown dog carrying a newspaper in the maw, I am inclined to
think that its owner must be somewhere around. If it were just an unknown dog without any
printed embellishments, the hypothesis might be ill justiﬁed. Note that the mere presence of the
owner in the same place does not imply that the dog carries a newspaper, but it is implied at the
momentthe owner givesthe dog one to carry, so the conjunction may be establisheddeductively.
Thus, (53) may be used as a way of assuming that there is some proposition which implies both
conjuncts.
We need a formalization of abduction which can be used in the language of semantic representa-
tions. Such a formalization has two aspects. Talking about AI treatments of diagnosis, Raymond
Reiter (Reiter, 1987)notes that ”Many non-monotonicinferences are abductiveby nature, which
is to say they provide plausible explanations for some states of affairs... The problem, of course,
is that not just any explanation will do; it must, in some sense, be a ”best” explanation... But
if there is a best theory, there must be poor ones; so diagnostic reasoning really consists of two
problems: (a) What is the space of possible theories that account for the given evidence? (b)
What are the best theories in this space?” In this paper we will by and large ignore the problem
of the choice of the best explanation in a context, and concentrate on the description of the space
of available explanations and on their structure.
3.1.2 Poole systems
Asimpleformalizationofthisideaforﬁrst orderlanguagesisas follows(Poole, 1988a): a subset
P of ground instances14 of a set of some possible hypotheses
  is an explanation for observation
 , according to (54).
(54)
 
[
  explains
  if and only if
 
 
 
 
[
 
j
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[
  is consistent
14Ground instances are basically substitution instances of formulas in which all variables are replaced by con-
stants.
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The set of propositions
  represents our factual knowledge in the situation in which inference
is done,
  is the observation to be explained, and P is the set of hypotheses available to us.
Whenever hypotheses must be used each time they can be consistently used, we can speak of
defaults. In thiscaseweshall usethenotation
  fordefaults. A formaltheory withhypotheses
 
ordefaults
 andwiththefacts
 willalsobesometimescalledabductiveframework
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
or
 
 
 
 
 
 
 .
Let us consider an example. Suppose we have a theory which tells us that birds ﬂy as a rule,
but that ostriches deﬁnitely do not ﬂy. Call this abductive framework
 
 
 
 
 . It has a set of
defaults,
 , which contains the rule-like assumption that birds ﬂy. It is actually an open formula
which gives rise to a hypothesis whenever all its variables are replaced by some constants. Such
a substitution instance can be used as a hypothesis only if it is consistent, otherwise (54ii) is
violated.
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This theory allows us to explain that tweety ﬂies, but not that polly ﬂies, because such an expla-
nation would contradict the facts.
Using implications with open formulas as a formalization of rules is sometimes unwieldy. There
is a transformationwhich is formost purposesequivalentwith theoriginal theory which replaces
such defaults and hypotheses by their names. The form of the names can be standardized to
atomic predicates, and the names can serve as defaults or hypotheses then instead of the rules
they stand for. Let
 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  be some default with the free variables
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . Let
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  be a new
 -place predicate which we want to use as the name of the default.
Weadditasahypothesisoradefault, addtheimplication
 
8
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!
 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 asanewfactto
 , andthroughouttheoriginaldefaultorhypothesis
 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 .
The new theory does not add any new deductions to the old one, as Poole (1988b) shown, but all
the hypotheses and the defaults are now atomic predicates with as many free variables, as there
are in the original defaults and no other parameters.
Consider a modiﬁcation of (55) as an exampleof this transformation. The modiﬁcationconcerns
the status of the rule for ostriches. Suppose we are not sure that all emus do not ﬂy, although
we expect them not to. Then
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!
:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  is assigned the status of a default. Now
we choose a new predicate to name this default and another one to name the original default.
Then we have the standardized form of (55) and this modiﬁcation is (56), where
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  are the new atomic default predicates.
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Now we can explain both
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  and
:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given this basic idea of abductive reasoning, how can it be put into use in a theory of interpreta-
tion? What is the structure of such a theory and which problems does it present?
We postulate a semantic level of representation the formulas of which build some kind of the
semantic form of a sentence. These formulas are treated as evidence to be explained in formal
sense by their more speciﬁc contextual meanings.
We therefore need the following three components in our theory: semantic patterns (semantic
forms) associated with the syntax, contextually speciﬁed knowledge which provides formal ex-
planations of the semantic forms and rules that relate them. The rules use the mechanism of
abduction. The task of the theory of interpretation in case of a sentence
  may be formally
described as ﬁnding an abductive framework
  such that
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  and for some
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
 
 
[
 
[
 
j
 


 
 
 
 
 
In this formula,
  and
  are subsets of ground instances of formulas in
 
 
  respectively,

 a
context and
 
 
 
 
  is the semantic form of
 . We will call

 the context of interpretation. From
this it is clear that we are interested in the origin of
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 .
Since we do not want to provide explanations on a sentence by sentence basis, we must specify
what are explanations which are in some sense basic (perhaps corresponding to words) and how
they are combined. Also,
 
 
 
0 does not specify how the truth conditions for
  are reﬂected
in
 
[
 , though we might suspect that
 
[
 
[
  deﬁnes the truth of
  in the context of
interpretation. We shall turn to these questions in the sequel. They all have to do with the space
of hypotheses used for
 
 
 
0.
3.2 The explanation space for abduction
We assume that the semantic form of
  is related to the representational devices usually called
logical forms in linguistics. Logical forms are a kind of syntactic structures which serve as
a basis for the recursive deﬁnition of truth. The level of Logical Form where these objects
are located encodes the principles of compositionality under standard assumptions borrowed
from model-theoretic semantics. However, both the truth-deﬁnitional and the compositionality
properties of semantic forms are somewhat different, since truth conditions cannot usefully be
deﬁned on them, and explanations do not easily compose. Compositionality receives a different
status as a consequence of this. Let us see why this is so.
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A standard development of compositional semantics would have it that given two meanings
 
and
  together with an operation of composition
  deﬁned for them,
 
 
 
 
 
  is just another
meaning. The truth conditions for
 
 
 
 
 
  depend on those of
  and
 . Somewhat similarly,
if
  and
  are semantic forms, and
  an operation of composition deﬁned for them,
 
 
 
 
 
  is
just another semantic form. But what can we say about the explanations of
 
 
 
 
 
 ? Can they
be derived from those for
  and those for
 ? Not necessarily. For one thing,
  may have no
or less explanations in the context


0, which is like the context of interpretation

 for
 
 
 
 
 
 ,
but without the resources of
 . Or it may be the case that some explanations of
  become
canceled in the transition from


0 to

. The principle of compositionality for explanations is
manifest only in our expectations that any explanation of
 
 
 
 
 
  must be somehow based on
theexplanationsof
 and
 , and, perhaps, ontheadditionalhypothesesintroducedby

forsome
reason, if this is an option. Explanations do not come out of the blue. Similarly, truth deﬁnitions
use explanations rather than semantic forms, so we do not expect to ﬁnd strict compositionality.
We compose a semantic form and pool the explanation resources which are associated with each
lexical or formal lexicon component, and perhaps those which may be associated with abstract
grammatical structures. The net effect is not necessarily cumulative.
Formally, any change in the hypotheses space under this procedure is due to the introduction of
new predicates, the introduction of new rules and the introduction of new individuals. Note that
we are doing representational semantics, so the sources of predicates and individuals are based
on the theory of representations. Nevertheless, we will still use models to avail ourselves of the
tools of model-theoretic semantics, much like in Discourse Representation Theory of Kamp and
Reyle (1993), in order to motivate representational decisions. So, the ﬁrst question is where do
the predicates and the individualsof the representations come from in the case of lexical entries?
3.2.1 Semantic form and meanings in context.
We might as well start by asking the natural question of what degree of abstraction meanings in
context have.
There are a number of results from psychological investigations which suggest that processing
information about objects is done in two subsystems which are to a large extent independent
of one another. One subsystem is more specialized in identifying objects, i.e. establishing the
identity of perceived objects across time by consulting memory, another system maps percep-
tually identiﬁed and stored objects and their identiﬁcation routines onto the general conceptual
knowledge, providing connections to other areas of knowledge with possibilities to infer differ-
ent things about objects in general. One such result was reported in Warrington (1978).
Warrington conducted a series of experiments with brain damage patients with different patterns
of behavior. Patients with one kind of brain damage were unable to identify an oboe when it
was presented in an untypical perspective, but ’recognized it’ when it was named, stating its use
and properties. They were well able to identify it in the typical perspective. Other patients, with
a different kind of damage, were sure that it was the same object under both perspectives, but
were unable to explain properties like the purpose of its use, or to relate it to other objects in
general.
If it is assumed that the perceptual system identiﬁes whether two perceived objects are simply
two views of one and the same object, and that the conceptual system deﬁnes a mapping of
the schemes in the perceptual identiﬁcation system to the conceptual schemata which allow to
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draw inferences about objects, then, as was suggested, these observations can be explained.
The relation between the systems is not quite as simple, presumably, but one important point is
evident: the interpretation of words does not go as far as the identiﬁcation system. But how far
does it go in the conceptual system?
Searle (1980) argued that some aspects of meaning are not really linguistic in character, but
belong to more general conceptual background in terms of which the meanings are made more
precise in context. His example is the verb cut. Cutting grass, paper or cake are actually rather
different activities, differing, in particular, in the instruments that are used and in the overall
results. Our expectations about the outcome of cutting activities depend on this knowledge
of the differences. Cutting nice patterns into grass with scissors would not usually count as
grass cutting, neither would the use of a lawn-mower for cutting a cake be anticipated. Yet this
knowledgedoesnotseem tobedirectlyrelevanttothemappingofmeaningstogrammar. Rather,
there seems to be some system of classifying all these situations as situations in which cutting
something takes place, hence leading to an abstraction. This classiﬁcation system is probably
due as much to the linguistic needs, as to the conceptual necessity of such a classiﬁcation.
Contextual meaning could therefore be argued to be a speciﬁcation of some more underspec-
iﬁed linguistically relevant meaning which is contextually invariant. Thus, Bierwisch (1983)
made the proposal that contextual variants of a verb might differ from its contextually invari-
ant meaning and Bierwisch (1981, 1983) argued that, e.g. losing something is an event which
has different conceptual descriptions depending on the kind of object lost, e.g. lose a fortune
in speculations, lose (in) a game, lose consciousness, lose money from one’s pocket vs. lose
money on the stock market. Conceptually differentiated meanings are contextual variants of a
more general representational object Bierwisch calls semantic form which describes losing in
very general terms which cover all the instances. Verbs are thus related to very abstract char-
acterizations of situations, and via these to some more detailed representations, and these relate
via the perceptual system to situations in the real world. We will assume, due in part to the
results of Warrington, that it is not our concern to specify how a contextual interpretation can be
used to identify a situation which can verify an utterance about this situation. But must be more
explicit as far as contextual dependence is concerned. We shall consider situation schemata as
the most detailed representation structures associated with verbs used in the interpretation of
utterances. They do possess some distinguishable features. The most prominent one is that the
objects encoded in situation schemata will often correspond to what Rosch (1978) called the ba-
sic level of abstraction. At this level, for instance instruments are scissors and lawn mowers, but
not instruments in general. A situation scheme may therefore encode grass and lawn mowers or
scissors and paper. But no situation scheme involves the notion instrument. To account for this
latter level of abstraction we will introduce situation types, i. e. representations which collapse
a number of situation schemata. It is probably this level which corresponds most closely to the
Semantic Form of Bierwisch. Nevertheless, we will reserve the term ”semantic form” for enti-
ties which simply encode the semantic properties of the syntax. We will also hypothesize that
situation schemata encode the core of a situation which a simple sentence with the associated
verb is usually said to denote, and are therefore adequate most speciﬁc explanations which are
brought into the common pool by verbs. These situation cores are cantered around events.
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3.2.2 Situations and verbs
The view that sentences denote situations is quite common in semantics by now, so there is no
need to introduce it. But some particulars of the view adopted here should be commented upon.
The world is in a state of ﬂux. To be able to retain information about it, the continuous ﬂow of
information is constantly being chunked and frozen by the cognitive system. Situations in the
technical sense in which we use the term here are aspects of the world frozen in such chunks.
Any talk of situations in the real world is therefore of necessity fragmentary, since any attempt
to chunk the world in static portions corrupts it. A theory of situations in this sense is a never-
ending enterprise akin to studying the human perception of time, etc. To take entities like situa-
tions as a piece of ontology of the world is therefore probably not entirely unproblematic. The
non-existence of situations as ontological entities, however, should not hinder us from using
them as a ﬁgure of speech: we could talk of situations as a human way of making static pictures
of a ﬂuid world. Informally we could continue speaking of situations in the real world, though
questions of the identity of situations, etc., could be then be bypassed. This is perhaps too sim-
ple a solution, yet we shall stick to it and only take up the question of situations as entities later,
when discussing context.
As far as the role of situations as classiﬁcation schemata for larger-scale patterns of the world
are concerned, the results of Warrington (1978) are suggestive. Extrapolating these ﬁndings to
the case of situations, it seems reasonable to assume that there are two subsystems involved in
patterning the world into situations, too. One of them takes care of perceptually deﬁned aspects
of identifying whether the world at some particular time can be classiﬁed as some situation by
reference to some similarity criteria and with respect to the identity of objects involved, the
other constructs a mapping of such perceptual classiﬁcations to general conceptual systems.
This analogy, if warranted, invites us to expect that frozen chunks of information extracted from
the information ﬂow and called situations will be processed by two subsystems, too. The ﬁrst
identiﬁes a situation according to some criteria bound to the identiﬁcations systems for objects.
The identiﬁcation patterns are related to the patterns of general knowledge about them within
the second system. Two immediate consequences emerge: (1) the structure of a situation in our
view is based on objects and (2) there may be principles of patterning the perceptual or other
knowledge which are not due to perceptual systems. .
Situations in the world (sidestepping the identiﬁcational part, which we are not interested in
here) are thus represented as situation schemata (e. g. cutting grass with a lawn-mower). Situ-
ations schemata are classiﬁed in situation types (the type ’cutting situation’, for instance). Sit-
uation types collapse similar situation schemata and we assume that they are mainly there due
to the needs and purposes of lexicalization. Apart from these two types of representations asso-
ciated with the verbs there also must be a theory (in the logical sense of the word) to the effect
that different contextual and corresponding grammatical realizations wrt. the participants in a
situation type are possible only in certain combinations when mapped onto syntactic relations, i.
e. there must be a theory relating situation types and situation schemata to syntax via semantic
forms. These three complex theories will serve as basic hypotheses spaces for the interpreta-
tion, deﬁning the context of interpretation in general. We will not have much to say about the
interpretation of nouns or adjectives here.
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3.2.3 The structure of a situation type
As noted we assume that the structure of a situation scheme is tied to objects. The structure
of the situation type, in contrast, is more like a cognitively deﬁned pattern which on the one
hand must ﬁt the structure of situation scheme and on the other hand must itself serve as a
structuringmechanismwhichrearranges theseschemataintosomethingwhichismoreamenable
to linguistic realization. We would like to distinguish the following aspects of this structure,
without trying to achieve completeness.
Formal structure
The formal structure is used as a blueprint for situation schemes, i.e. a skeleton to hook all other
information on. The ontology of situations, i.e. events, states, and individuals, is deﬁned here.
This is the (claim about the) ontology of our internal model of the world. Whereas there are
conceivably ’linguistically pure states’ like silence, states are normally states of something, i.e.
state is a relative notion; in some cases it is the state of the world as an abstract entity. States
are in the situation only by virtue of their being states of individuals in the situation. Similarly
for events. Events are (representations of) complex patterns of change which are singled out by
the cognitive system. Situation schemata introduce the entities the events and states are bound
to. Situation types may moreover introduce entitles which are linguistically relevant. States are
patterns of invariance within a situation connected to individuals, events are changes of, in or
about the individuals. We refer to the individuals as the bearers of the events, if the changes
in some of their characteristics constitute these events, and similarly for states. Events can be
speciﬁed as having temporal duration by the function
 
 
 
 , their temporal trace function. There
are different factors determining this period and relating it to the time of situation
 
 
 
 . The time
ofthe situationis the timein the real world for which we are inclined to accept the categorization
by a situation scheme. We will not follow Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) in deﬁning events
as changes in states, however, but adopt a different conceptual structuring. We shall adopt a
simple theory of events and states along the lines of Kowalski and Sergot (1986) which assumes
both to be ontological primitives, cf. also Shanahan (1989, 1997). Though events are not simply
changes in state, they relate to states. In particular, they always terminate and initiate states with
certain antagonistic properties. Lexical information can specify these states, if required by the
structure of the language in question. The need of lexical speciﬁcation of the states initiated or
terminated by events has been demonstrated, for example, for Russian in Demjjanow (1998).
We will follow Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) in making another assumption, however: our
cognitive system is able to distinguish change only if it can be registered as a change in the
value of some cognitively deﬁnable attribute of an individual, i. e. its state. This assumption
determines much of the theory of events and states. For each event there is at least one attribute
of at least one individual which has different state values before and after the event (Kamp and
Rossdeutscher, 1994, make a similar assumption). But for some internal processes which are
patterns of behavior this default could amount to the statement that a pattern of behavior lasted
an amount of time, e.g. perhaps for sleep. Of course, we might be more precise, and some such
property might be listed explicitly, e.g. sleep for an hour speciﬁes a condition on the state as the
one which originated after the event of sleeping lasted one hour. Any state can be assumed by
default to have been initiated by an event, so there may be implicit but unexpressed events, if a
situation speciﬁes a state. If a state is initiated, some other state is terminated. A state is taken to
persist in time, if not explicitly contradicted via an event which terminates it. On the whole we
expect that if an event is not explicitly or implicitly speciﬁed, it is not assumed. Hence we can
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always defeasibly know if a state persists or not. We summarizebelow somedefault conventions
regulating the behavior of events within a situation, following in part Shanahan (1989):
Event postulates within a situation
 
￿ no events are assumed other than those known to occur in
 
￿ no event can affect a state in
  other than those known to do so in
 
￿ states persist in
  until some event terminates them in
 
We should probably adopt another additional postulate
￿ every state known to hold can be assumed to have an explanation in terms of events.
Note that the term explanation is meant in the formal sense here. It is important to keep in mind
that these are default conventions holding for real world applications, so to say. We are not
committed to producing the state which was terminated by the big bang.
The status of the formal ontology in this paper is rather like that of a human model of the
world. A formal model of this model is a set-theoretic structure which formal semantics also
calls a model, in which a language is interpreted and in terms of which its truth conditions are
given. Events, states and individuals have properties some of which may seem rather normative.
Yet these normativeness is the price of our cognitive modeling the world. Thus, we assume for
instance that all individualsin themodel, like events, states and plain objects, build up a universe
structured by the part-of relation. This move reﬂects the hypothesis that such structures are very
useful in cataloging reality.
Thus, we postulate a sorted domain of discourse which contains plain atomic and plurality in-
dividuals, events and event complexes, states and state complexes15 Every one of these sorts is
a complete atomic free upper semi-lattice with a bottom element
?. Thus, every sort is a set
  with a partial ordering relation
￿ on it such that for all
 
￿
  the least upper bound, l.u.b,
W
  exists (
  is complete), for all
 
 
 
2
 , if
:
 
￿
 , then there exists an atom

 such that


￿
 
 
:


￿
  (
  is atomic), for all
 
2
 
 
 
￿
 , if
  is an atom, and
 
￿
 , then there
exists a
 
2
  such that
 
￿
  (
  is free). The binary sum operation
￿ which can be deﬁned on
these structures is simply the l.u.b of the two operands.
One of the uses of this property is plural predication. We interpret pluralities either as atoms
or as sums. If something is predicated of a plurality, the predication is interpreted distribu-
tively by default. Thus, suppose the constant
 
 
 
 
 
  denotes a plurality of people in context

.
Then,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  is an expression with a predicate which has by default a particular axiom
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
￿
 
!
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . This axiom can be applied recursively, until the
atomic individuals are reached. For atomic individuals, be they plural or singular, the value
of the predicate is determined in the model explicitly. In general we will tacitly assume the
set-theoretic apparatus introduced in Krifka (1998). Properties of the events, states, times and
individuals in the model will be introduced as the need arises.
15We shall adopt the common practice of calling events and states eventualities and will use one sort of variable
for the two,
e or
E, where the difference is not crucial.
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We will also make use of another, different notion of structure of the situation denoted by the
sentence, which we will discuss in the next subsection under the name of relational structure.
Since we actually have no situations as ontological entities in the model, this structure is only
reﬂected in representations, i. e. in the situation schemata and the situation types. This allows
us to assume that a situation type is always associated with one event, which may be complex at
the representational level, but an atomic event in the model.
Relational structure
Relational structure of the situation type organizes events and states in it in relations which are
characteristic of a situation of this type, and endows them with their characteristic temporal
properties at the level of situation schemata. A relational structure is a fundamental theory for
the interpretation of a verb, and the patterns it provides must be simple enough to be coded in to
language.
We will assume two basic types of simplex events, agentive and thematic, besides states. The
two event types are meant to be related to the dichotomy between unergative and unaccusative
clauses, cf. Perlmutter (1978), Rosen (1984). Representationally complex events are assumed
to be built from at most two events and states justiﬁed by these events. If a complex event is
built from simplex events, the logical possibilities for types of relations are listed in (57). The
relations are always asymmetric and the ﬁrst term of a relation is conceptually (and sometimes
temporally) prior to the second. The ﬁrst term of a relation type is listed in the ﬁrst row of the
table, the second in the ﬁrst column. The cell with the coordinates
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
  contains the
name of the relation.
(57)
agentive thematic state
agentive
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
thematic
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
state
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
}
The classiﬁcation is based on intuitive considerations of how situation schemes associated with
verbs or adjectives relate to eventualities. In this sense it is a hypothesis about the conceptual
mechanisms of humans, i. e. only a heuristic assumption, which it is impossible to prove. The
symbol
} indicates that relations on states do not add up to a situation scheme.
The simple relations in the table are merely formal entities and serve as a convenient classi-
ﬁcation scheme which may be further instantiated abductively by a number of more speciﬁc
relations. Consider what relations occur in Russian, tentatively. The relation
 
 
 
 
  seems to
be a good candidate for classifying causative structures. Following Miller and Johnson-Laird
(1976) (p. 457), we may assume that many causative verbs express a relation between two
events, the ﬁrst of which is something that an agent does, the second an event in the theme
object that his action causes. Note that we do not want to deﬁne this relation outright and en-
dow it with general properties, but merely assume that it can be deﬁned conceptually in some
way which allows for degrees of causative involvement which depend on a particular situation
type. Thus, speciﬁc agentive causative situation types will contain special cases of the relation


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
 . Nevertheless there must be two individuals involved in each situation, at least one
in each event, according to our theory of events, and this is a general property of


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
 .
There are many analyses of causation (i.e. of the concept of causation), which are insufﬁcient,
presumably, as models of the human concept, but having their uses in science. Shoham (1988)
pointed out that any causation concept probably involves constructing a theory for each kind of
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causation, apart from it being expressibleas a predicate on events. A similar approach was taken
by Kamp and Rossdeutscher (1994). The theory of the situation-speciﬁc notion of causation it-
self may be deferred until it is needed, but nevertheless, the relation is assumed to be speciﬁcally
deﬁned in a situation scheme. We assume therefore that


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
  is deﬁned via a number of
situation-scheme speciﬁc concepts, apart from possible general properties. Another candidate
for an instance of
 
 
 
 
  is the concept of inanimate causation, which is probably also deﬁned in
situation types.
Russian does not seem to lexicalize the
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  relation, and though it has some analytic
causal forms similar to make him laugh to express it, they are lexically restricted to more spe-
cialized verbs than make, e. g. Russian uses an equivalent of force in this construction.
The
 
 
 
  relation could be interpreted as the change of perspective on the agentive/thematic
event pair, i. e. this could be the relation which surfaces as passive. It is then, of course,
necessary to specify the relation between
 
 
 
  and
 
 
 
 
  within the same situation, but we will
sidestep this issue.
It is difﬁcult to come up with a generalization leading to
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  relation, perhaps because
there are no interesting similarities in the relations between two thematic events which could
lead to some grammaticalizaton strategies for them.
States in the speciﬁcation of the relational structures play a particularly interesting role in Rus-
sian. If we specify the state which is terminated by the event, the resulting relation is often
lexicalized as a preﬁxed verb denoting the beginning of an action, e. g. pet’ (sing) - za-pet’
(start to sing; the state terminated was characterized by not singing). If a state is speciﬁed as
initiated by the event, the relation is also usually lexicalized as a preﬁxed verb, but the interpre-
tation is that of some interesting state caused by the event. For


 
 
 
  as one instant of
 
 
 
 
 
relation this post-state is usually a characteristic resulting state of the thematic change brought
forth by the agentiveevent. The notion of result will play an important role in our developments.
This much is part and parcel of many analyses of agentive causation. The reason of recapitu-
lating it here is to make clear the position of the authors: elements of relational structures of
a language are language independent, but might be arranged differently and lead to different
lexicalization patterns.
3.2.4 Situation schemata in relation to situation types
Thematic structure of a situation scheme
Giventhatindividualsare thereason forthepresence ofeventsand statesin thesituationscheme,
these three types of entity are related within the scheme. As noted, these relations are often
deﬁned on the basic level of abstraction. Consequently, we expect a less degree of abstraction
of relations, than in the situation types, since the role of the situation types is to pick out general
patterns.
Suppose we have a situation schema of somebody cutting grass with a lawn-mower. It would
describe this individual in a speciﬁc way of being the operator of the machine, executing some
kind of program involving this instrument to achieve some change in the state of grass. This
change is speciﬁed as a purpose to be achieved as part of a plan.
Toindicatethatfact thatthepredicatewithan eventualityargument
  mightintroduceadiscourse
referent in the discourserepresentation structure in the sense of Kamp and Reyle (1993) we shall
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preﬁx it with
 
 . We thus have something like a name for the eventuality in a given context
where it is introduced. Consider what could be in a description of the situation in which grass
is being cut by a lawn mower. Let the main event of the situation be named
 
 


 
 
￿
 
 
 
 
 
￿
 
 
 
 
￿
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . This situation scheme is an instance of the situation type of causative
situations, so we expect a situation-particular causative relation


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
  to hold of at least
two events in the situation. We also expect an individual entity
  which is being cut in the event
 
0. We know it is grass, hence the name of the situation would imply the following formulas:
 
 
￿
 
 
 
 
 
￿


 
 
 
 
 
 
0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, this situation scheme is an instance of the situation type of cutting which speciﬁes a
particular property of the instrument, i. e. that it is a lawn-mower. The following is then also
implied:


 
 
 
 
 
 
￿
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
￿
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We also expect to have
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  which could be the situation-anchored relation
between an individual which is the agent and the event
  describing its role. We shall forgo the
elaborations of what it takes for
  and
  to satisfy
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  and similar theories
for


 
 
 
 
 
 
￿
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
￿
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 and
 
 
￿
 
 
 
 
 
￿


 
 
 
 
 
 
0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . Note
that we also need a theory of


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
 , because it is not deducible from general principles
of causation governing


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
 .
Another variation on the situation scheme is the one for Searle’s example of cutting paper with
scissors. Again, it is obtained by consideringwhat kind of descriptionis tendentiallytrue in such
a situation. The scissors-cutting situation where John is cutting paper with the scissors would
make (58) true. The


 
 
 
  predicate is situation speciﬁc which we indicate again by
 . This
time we may attempt to give more details.
(58)
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￿


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
￿


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
￿
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
￿


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The event
  is the event associated with
  undergoing a transformation due to its being cut,
 
  is the agentive event. It probably consists of manipulating the scissors. The reason the
instrument is nevertheless associated with the event of being cut rather than that of manipulating
thescissors is that the scissors of itselfis not an instrument, unless used in the appropriateway in
an appropriate event. The predicate


 
 
 
 
 
 
￿
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
  is more speciﬁc, than a predicate which
would roughly correspond to
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , because we need speciﬁc information to support
speciﬁc inferences in the situation of cutting with the scissors.


 
 
 
 
 
 
￿


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  is a
complexpredicate which covers thenecessary relationshipbetween the two states of
  which are
initiated and terminated by event
 , and which probably have characteristics like
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 . The reason for its introduction is as follows: The exact deﬁnition of states
like
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  and


 
 
 
 
  for ﬁngers, paper, grass, etc. in the case of scissors, is a matter
of contextual speciﬁcation, similar in principle to those in other cutting situations. So we just
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register this with the dummy predicate


 
 
 
 
 
 
￿


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , which can be substituted by
a contextually more explicit version.
The detailed predicates in this description may be called individual thematic roles, following
Dowty (1989). They are very particular, since they are deﬁned within the situation scheme.
Similarly, the two situation-particular theories


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
  are instances of the general scheme
of a causative situation


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
  and are interpreted both in the conceptual and in the per-
ceptual system, since they are causal theories of the particular relation which must hold in the
situation.
Since there are things to some extent common to all agentive situations of cutting things with
instruments, we may assume that these situation schemata are condensed to a situation type.
We suppose that there is a predicate which tendentially generalizes over things being cut in
all agentive cutting situations centering about the general eventuality
  which is conceived
as consisting of the causative chain


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
 . Call this predicate


 
 
 
 
 
 
￿
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 .
Similarly, we introduce a predicate
 
 
￿
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  which generalizes over instruments
and a predicate


 
 
 
 
 
 
￿
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  to characterize all the agents in cutting situations. Then
the type of situation could be speciﬁed by the description which any agentive cutting situation
should tendentially satisfy, (59).
(59)
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￿
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
￿


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note how we have a change of context. The situation type predicates make no reference to the
original events, only to the main indexing eventuality of the situation. This means that the rules
specifying the relation between the type and a scheme should keep track of the events in the
causative pair which constitutes
 , and perhaps of initiated and terminates states, too. Which
rules should these be?
The situation of cutting with the scissors was a more speciﬁc instance of (59). So we need
some kind of generalizing rules which relate the differing predicates. The relation between the
predicates in thesituationschemeand thepredicates in the situationtypewould be that oflogical
implication, as in (60), perhaps somewhat weaker, and we assume that it can be be formalized in
Poole systems with interesting results. Although it is not evident, it seems that there is no need
to represent the relational structure of the situation scheme at the type level of representation in
detail, which can be left implicit in the rules which should keep track of the causative relation,
etc.. The rules relate two contexts, a situation scheme and a situation type, and the situation
scheme has discourse referent
  as its quasi-name (the subscript on


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  does not
introduce it; we could have chosen another). We shall have more to say about contexts in a
moment.
(60)
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To obtain a Poole system from these rules we may drop the quantiﬁer preﬁxes and postulate
that the implications are hypotheses. Then a predicate like


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  may have a
potential explanation via
 
 
￿


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  from the scheme for cutting with
scissors, or via
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  from the scheme for cutting grass with
a lawn-mover, or via some other available situation scheme.
Situation types arise as generalizations over situation schemata. We assume these generaliza-
tions to comprise two things: a change of context which drops inessentials, with the context
becoming more abstract, and the generalization over thematic structure. To move from a situa-
tion scheme to a situation type we drop the events of the relational structure and leave only the
indexing event, which we will assume to be introduced by a verb. This is a change of context.
Thus,ifwehad


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
 inthesituation
 
 


 
 
￿
 
 
 
 
 
￿
 
 
 
 
￿
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ,wewillhave
 
0
 


 
 
 
 
0
  as the new context of the situation type of cutting in general which is introduced by
the verb cut. The expression


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
  is no longer present in the context. Note moreover
that we would like
 
0
 


 
 
 
 
0
  to be less speciﬁc, than
 
 


 
 
￿
 
 
 
 
 
￿
 
 
 
 
￿
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 .
Now we have a two-stage model of the explanation space for the interpretation of the verb cut.
We can consider the problem of building the missing link to the syntax. Individual thematic
role predicates which are similar across different situation schemata can be generalized over,
giving rise to (type-of-) thematic roles. These can be further generalized, yielding what will be
called theta-roles which are situation and hence verb independent. Theta roles are mapped onto
semantic forms. We shall start building the interface of linking rules by discussing the nature of
semantic forms and their role in the interpretation.
3.3 Semantic patterns for syntax
What are the desiderata for semantic forms? Basically there are two sources of the syntactically
introduced evidence which has to be explained by interpretation. The ﬁrst source are lexical
entries, the second source are syntactic relations deﬁned on syntactic objects. We will be not
particularly interested in the semantics of DPs. Thus, we will assume that a noun like ’bird’ in-
troduces some predicate, say
 
 
 
 
 
 
  which is then interpreted by abductive inference, but will
leave this part out. Determiners introduce tripartite structures, as a rule. More complex assump-
tions will be used for verbs. With verbs we have their lexical meanings which are predicates
on eventualities16 and the syntactic relations which have to be interpreted relative to the lexical
entry of the verb: at least the subject of the sentence and the two object relations, the direct and
the indirect object. We thus need relations between the arguments of the verb and the events it
introduces (argument relations), and principles which map argument relations to the syntax and
which are usually called argument structure, linking rules, etc.. These principles use semantic
forms of grammatical relations, i. e. the counterparts of the elements of interpretable syntactic
structure, which are to be interpreted by the argument relations.
To implement this we shall assume that the relevant syntactic relations are interpreted via se-
mantic forms in two ways simultaneously: as facts about syntactic structure, and as observations
about argument mappings which are to be explained. Since we are not allowed to explain facts
in an abductive framework, we shall assign two predicates to an interpretable syntactic relation.
One of them then contributes to facts, the other is evidence. Suppose, for instance, we have to
16This moveis basedonthe familiarneo-davidsonianrenderingof theverbsemantics, exempliﬁedin muchwork,
in particular in ...
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interpret the relation which holds between
 
0 and its complement
 
 , namely
 
 
0
 
 
℄. We
construct an abductive framework (61) which contains two expressions interpreting,
 
 
0
 
 
℄,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  and
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . The mnemonics should suggest that we interpret the syntactic
relation which is commonly called indirect object. At the same time we have the eventuality
predicate
j
j
 
0
j
j introduced by the verb with
  the eventuality argument of the verb.
(61)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
f
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
j
j
 
0
j
j
 
 
 
g
 
 
 
;
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The expression
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  is a fact within this abductive framework. We want to be able to
use theinformationthat somespeciﬁed syntacticrelationholds duringinference. The expression
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  is the evidence which has to be interpreted.
We would like to consider this approach to the interpretation of syntactic relations in some more
detail, since it will be fairly generally applied.
Though there are no arboreal notions involved, we keep the traditional generative notation. Con-
sider (62).
(62) PrP
DP
 
 
℄
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pr
0
Pr
0 VP
V
0
 
 
℄
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We assumed that
 
  John introduced the constant
 , and the lexical entry for the verb walks
introduced the predicate
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , deﬁned on eventualities, and an eventuality discourse referent
 . If we ignore the fact that
 
 
 
 
℄ is phonetically realized in the position of the head of its
chain after being moved there, we may consider the relation between
 
 
 
 
℄ and the
 
0
 
 
℄ of
 
 
  be the relation between the subject and the predicate of the predication. Let us abbreviate
the occurrence of this relation by
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 . We consider
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
  to be a fact in
the abductive framework to be constructed, and introduce a corresponding argument relation
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
  as a semantic observation which is to be formally explained. In other words,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  is an evidence for its explanation. The fact allows us to let syntactic information
control inference. The evidence allows us to specify the need for interpretation.
We use the indices as discourse referents, following Kamp and Reyle (1993). Therefore,
  will
be in a sense the name of a discourse representation structure in which the abductive frame-
work is to be applied, and
 ,
  are discourse individuals in this structure. Since we have no
quantiﬁcation there are no tripartite structures. Examples (63-65) illustrate the process of inter-
pretation. Remember that we ignored the abductive interpretation aspects of
 
 s, so
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
is an abbreviation of whatever we abduced.
Given the relation
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


  we construct the discourse representation structure (DRS) in (63),
where the status of evidence is made explicit, and activate the abductive framework (64) which
is associated with this relation. Consider the situation discourse referent
  to be the name of the
DRS for the moment.
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(63)
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(64)
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g
 
 
 
;
 
After we substitute the semantic form of the verb and the corresponding discourse referents we
get (65).
(65)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
f
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
g
 
 
 
;
 
Note that we explicitly distinguish between the conditions which will have to be veriﬁed, and
inferential resources in the abductive framework, duplicating conditions, if they play both roles.
Why is this so? We do not want to verify
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , since this is a fact within the context of
interpretation which is yielded by our parsing mechanism. On the other hand we have to verify
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , but we also want it to be used in inference and therefore treat it within our abductive
task as a fact, too. This latter status does not mean that we already know that
 
 
 
 
 
 
  is true in
the situation, it merely reﬂects the role of the condition in the inferential interpretation.
Another interpretable relation we are interested in is that of direct object. It also introduces an
abductive framework and contributes a relation to be explained to the discourse representation
structure.
(66)
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That syntactic relation which gives rise to this abductive framework is that between
 
 
 
 
℄ and
 
0
 
 
℄ in (67).
(67) PrP
DP
 
 
℄
John
Pr
0
Pr
0 VP
DP
 


℄
the grass
V
0
 
 
℄
cut
Giventhetworelations,weassumethattheyinvolvedifferentindicesfordifferent,non-coreferential
 
 s. But since we use the same verb, we may combine the two abductive frameworks to get
(68), identifying the eventuality arguments of the verb.
(68)
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The discourse representation structure would be something in line with (69), where we ignore
the contribution of the deﬁnite article.
(69)
 
j
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
Other syntactic relations and the abductive frameworks they introduce will be discussed as the
need arises.
To proceed from here to the second stage of interpretation we must recall that it involves ar-
gument relations. How do we proceed? Let us forget for the moment discourse representation
structures and use semantic forms as expressions where relative scope and quantiﬁcational sta-
tus of
 
 s is shown as usual, but in which there is no situation discourse referent. A possible
representation for John walks is (70).
(70)
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This is almost neo-davidsonian semantics, which is quite commonly used now (cf. e. g. Krifka
(1998)...), except for
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  which is to be explained. As it was pointed out, the task
of assignment principles is to explain
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , among other things. Using the abductive
framework
 
 
 
 
  which speciﬁes the semantic form introduced by the syntactic relation of sub-
ject asamodel,wecan provideasimilarframeworktospecify thattheobservation
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
is to be explained by the argument relation
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , assuming for the moment we know what
relation this is. We could attempt to compose the two frameworks like in (68).
(71)
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But before we proceed with constructing argument assignment principles, we must ﬁrst settle
another question which becomes evident. The second abductive framework in our framework
pair does not mention the verb. The reason is we want argument assignment principles to be
verb independent and applicable to large classes of verbs. Yet we need the connection to the
verb which is registered in the framework
 
 
 
 
  to know in which eventuality the argument
relation is to be situated. We may express this requirement by putting both frameworks above
the line to indicate that they may be composed to explain
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , hence
  and
  are to be
identiﬁed. One way of viewing this problem is this: we have two contexts in which inference
may be done,and we need to synchronize them, so that they talk about the same entities. We
thus need some notion of context to guide inference. The notion of context we are interested
in is introduced in the paper McCarthy and Buvaˇ c (1998). The paper is not a complete formal
theory of contexts, but rather a collection of interesting proposals and illustrations. We feel free
to use them nevertheless, though other notions of context might turn out to be more appropriate.
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3.3.1 Semantic forms, contexts and situation types.
On the one hand, a context in this theory is a formal object, hence an object, and can be a
value of a ﬁrst-order variable. Since any statement is made in a context, it should be relativized
to something like


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!
 , where
  is the formula which makes a statement, and


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ﬁxes the context. On the other hand, a context is a generalization of the notion of a
collection of assumptionswhich build up a kind of axiomatic base of the context. One important
difference between an explicit collection of assumptions and a context, which suggests using
contexts as objects instead of mere sets of assumptions, is that a context could contain a number
of assumptions not known to us, i. e. we cold have only a partial knowledge of the context.
To state that an assertion
 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  is true in some context McCarthy and Buvaˇ c propose
to use the predicate
 
 
 
 


 
 
 , which means ’proposition
  is true in context

’. Note that this
statement is itself only true in some context, i. e.
 
 
 
 


0
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 . Similarly, the latter for-
mula is only true in a context. This creates an inﬁnite regress, but the latter is harmless, as the
authors indicate. We call the current most general context in which which we reason outer con-
text, following McCarthy and Buvaˇ c. This will mostly be the context of interpreting the whole
sentence.
A useful piece of notation to indicate that our reasoning takes place in a context is to preﬁx
all statements
 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  made in a context by the name of this context, i. e. to write


 
 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 17, e. g.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
￿
 
￿
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ”I fell asleep”.
Another way to use contexts is to conditionalize the statement on the context assumption, e. g.
to write


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
￿
 
￿
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! ”I fell asleep”
 
and use the context assumptions as assumptions in the sense of natural deduction, i. e. after
assuming


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
￿
 
￿
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , and deriving something, we conditionalizeon the context
and discharge this assumption.
Inference in a given context is done by entering a context. Entering a context


  and asserting
 
in this context is notated using the same
  preﬁx, cf. (72).
(72)


 
 
 
If


 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 , and we have entered context


  and inferred
  from
  in


 , we can leave this
context and obtain


 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 .
Now let us turn to our problem. We not only want to synchronize the contexts, but also would
like to be able to transform some important assertions in one context into assertions in another,
related context. Let us consider (58), (59) and (60) as abductive frameworks with facts only,
(58) and (59) introducing their own contexts, say cut-grass and cut. We repeat them as (73),
(74) and (75).
17We have already noted the use of of
e
:
P
(
e
) to indicate that the predicate
P
(
e
) introducesa discourse referent.
There will be no misunderstanding, if we explicitly state when we consider it to be entering the context or simply
providing a new variable. In a sense, however, we may alternate between eventualities and contexts they create,
without introducing a special notation, so the correct reading can always be coerced.
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(73)
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It can be derived that
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￿
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
￿
 
 
 
 
 
￿


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clearly we would like to be able to use this information in the more general context of the
situation type, i. e. to have


0
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
￿
 
 
 
 
 
￿


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But we can only do this hypothetically, since we merely assume that the situation type is instan-
tiated by this speciﬁc situation scheme. We therefore introduce a relation on contexts which we
call
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 


0
 , following McCarthy and Buvaˇ c, but use it to express that


0 has weaker
assumptionsthat

 but that inferences in

 may behypotheticallytransferred to


0 (and vice versa,
by abduction). We thus introduce special abductive frameworks which relate two contexts, cf.
(76). Other possible specializations require similar frameworks. Here
  is a proposition-valued
variable.
(76)
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Now we might put the rules in (60) into the context cut-grass. But note that if there are defaults
and hypotheses in cut-grass, we loose track under importation of which consequences are hypo-
thetical, and which not. To handle this we must import not only facts, but also hypotheses and
defaults of the more speciﬁc context with the possible indication of their rank with respect to the
specialization assumption. We will implicitly use this device, without writing all the hypotheses
out.
Now we may take care of variablehandling. Note that the variables
 
 
 
  and
  in (73), (74) and
(75) cannot be instantiated differently for different predicates within the same context. There-
fore, wewilltreat theeventvariablesas beingfunctionallydependent oncontext,i. e. apredicate
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like


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  in context

 should be actually understood as


 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 


 
 , where
 
 
 
 
are functions which introduce the events of the context. Furthermore, since
  is also unique
the context of interpretation of the verb, and since we introduce
  as a discourse referent of the
verb, we might as well use it instead of the name of the context of interpretation of the verb.
Then the rules in (60), for example, would look in this context like (77).
(77)
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Since these rules help to lift information in the vocabulary of a more speciﬁc context to a more
general one by relating the vocabulary, we will call them lifting rules.
We will use a number of ways to introduce conditions on contexts. If no misunderstanding
arises, we will use
 
  to indicate that we enter the context of verb interpretation with the event
variable
 . If we enter this context from the outer context, which we assume here to always
be the context of situation,
 , for simplicity, we write
 
 
 
 . A condition
  on context


we enter is written as
 
 


 
 , so


 
 
 
 
 
  is the context of interpretation of the verb cut, and
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
  is some context
  which specializes

, and is entered from

, and
must be exited therein.
There is now only one component left: the rules mapping a situation type to semantic forms.
Since they are to be verb-independent, they also require lifting rules, namely those relating a
particular situation type to the context of the linking rules. We will introduce them with an
example in the next section.
3.3.2 Linking rules
Now let us return to (68), where we assumed that the relation
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


  is interpreted by
some relation like
 
 
 
 
 . Such relations, which we call theta roles, are part of the theory of
semantic role interpretation. Their appearance in the theory is motivated by the desire to have a
verb-independent part of interpretation of semantic forms. Thematic roles types were deﬁned as
abstractions over similar argument relations in situation schemata. The situation schemata are
specialcasesofasituationtype, argumentrelationsinsituationschemataare speciﬁcrealizations
of thematic role types. Theta roles have situation types as there specializations. The predicates
of such a theory must be abductively interpretable in terms of all the situation types. They are
called theta roles to reﬂect the fact that they mediate between thematic roles (role types) and
semantic forms.
Developing such a theory is difﬁcult, and one reason of the difﬁculty are well-known verb argu-
ment alternations. Syntactic relations in an alternation become associated with different argu-
ments of the same verb as an alternative realization of these arguments. To give an illustration:
the verb cut participates in at least two alternations, the ”middlealternation” and the ”instrument
subject alternation” (Levin, 1993):
(78) a. John cut the paper with the knife
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b. The paper cuts easily
c. The knife cut the paper
Even when we disregard some subtle meaning shifts associated with these alternative realiza-
tions of arguments, we still face a problem of how to organize the alternatives in an abductive
framework. We will cover the cases (78a) and (78c) only, since (78b) involves additional difﬁ-
culties which we need not go into now.
Another difﬁculty is how to explain the particular principles of clustering of thematic roles in
theta roles. A suitable theory could borrow some clustering mechanism which are known in
linguistics, too, e. g. in the theory of argument selection by Dowty. David Dowty Dowty (1991)
proposed to control the assignment of grammatical functions to semantic relations by semantic
clustering mechanisms. He analyzed two groups of semantic properties which he considers to
be prototypical of the role of the agent and the role of the patient in the situation (79, 80).
(79) Contributing properties for the Agent Proto-Role
a. volitional involvement in the event or state
b. sentience (and/or perception)
c. causing an event or change of state in another participant
d. movement (relative to the position of another participant)
e. exists independently of the event named by the verb
(80) Contributing properties for the Patient Proto-Role
a. undergoes change of state
b. incremental theme
c. causally affected by another participant
d. stationary relative to movement of another participant
e. does not exist independently of the event, or not at all
The clustering mechanisms are a kind of categorization or grouping criteria. The choice of
the syntactic realization for a semantic relation is made dependent on how many prototypical
properties from the list the relation has relative to its arguments. The argument which gives rise
to moreimplicationswhich are on thelistof proto-agent properties willbe realized as thesubject
of an active sentence in English. If two arguments give rise to approximately the same number
of implications on the list, each of them can be realized as the subject (in the nominativecase) in
principle. Analogously for the non-agentive arguments of a three-place relation: the one which
gives rise to more implications from the proto-patient list is realized as the direct object (i. e.
in the accusative). The remaining argument is then realized as a prepositional object in English,
but in languages with a rich case system there are other options.
Dowty’s theory of argument selection is not one of the subject of the paper. Some clustering
mechanism like that of Dowty’s theory could be used in two ways in our theory, though. It
could underly the choice of which thematic roles in a situation types are classiﬁed as a particular
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theta role, e. g. as agents, patients, themes, etc, on the one hand. And it could play a role
in determining whether a particular default realization of a theta role should be adopted. The
number of theta roles is presumably determined by the design decisions of the language in
question and probably depends the grammatically relevant distinctions made in his language.
These two problems notwithstanding, we can settle on an exemplary course to show the feasi-
bility of the abductive treatment of theta roles: we will show, by an example how to model the
instrument subject alternation in an abductive framework.
Modeling the alternations
Remember that the theory of linking rules is a theory of lifting rules in the sense this term is
used in the theory of contexts. To model alternatives within such a theory we need a way to
introduce options. To be able to state interactions between related a new mechanism will be
introduced in abductive frameworks, the mechanism of constraints. Constraints will mimic the
use of negation as failure rule (NAF) in an abductive framework, among other things. We will
use the transformed form of the defaults in Poole systems, i. e. the form which has only atomic
predicates as defaults. Remember that these predicates only imply the rules which we want to
make cancelable.
The basic idea of using abductive frameworks for linking rules is to be able to state alternative
realizations of thematic role types in general and all at once, and let situation types control the
choice of a particular possible alternation, introducing some speciﬁcs, if necessary, by manipu-
lating the defaults.
Let us now return to (71), which we repeat here as (81) with two modiﬁcations. Interpreting
it we enter the context of the verb interpretation
 . We changed the status of the agentive
interpretation of the subject: instead of being a default it is now an absolute prescription: if
there is an agent in the situation, it is the subject in the sentence in the active voice. This choice
is motivated by the fact that in the alternations in (78) in which the subject is not missing but has
an interpretation different from the agentiveone is impossibleto refer to the agent by an adjunct.
Grammatical facts like
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
  are something which is settled in the context once and
for all and is not retractable.
(81)
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The theme is the direct object in (78a), but not in (78b). In other words, we need a default here.
We assume that we have a special predicate
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  which we consider to be a default,
and the implication it has is the rule of the default,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . Which gives
us (82).
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If we have an instrument which can become expressed as the subject, we need another default,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , which states that an instrument may be a subject, cf. (83).
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(83)
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We need two more defaults. One for the possibility that an instrument may be a real instrument,
under which interpretation it is realized probably as an adjunct. In this case we assume that
some relation


 
  is introduced as a semantic form. And one for another possibility, under
which there is no agent in the situation type, and the theme becomes the subject. The (almost)
complete example theory is given in (84).
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To complete the theory we need only to introduce the weak negations of the corresponding
default predicates to be able to state their so-called negation as failure, NAF. The negation as
failure rule runs like this (Nilsson and Maluszy´ nski, 1990): it is allowed to assume that the
negation of a predicate is present, if no contradiction can be deduced from the assumption.
Such a negation is retractable, if an explicit contradiction occurs, but has the main property
of the real negation otherwise: it contradicts the positive instances of the predicate. This rule
can be modeled in an abductive framework (Dung, 1991). The modeling of NAF is done in
Poole systems by means of constraints. A constraint is a formula which can be used to reject
an explanation, but which cannot be used in deduction, e. g. to augment explanations. The
deﬁnition of an explanationin an abductiveframework with constraints, defaults and hypotheses
is given in (85).
(85)
 
[
 
[
  explains
  if and only if
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j
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[
 
[
 
[
  is consistent
where
 
 
  are ground instances of formulas from the set of defaults
  and hypotheses
 , and
  are ground instances of the set of constraints
C. An abductive framework is then a quadruple
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
 
We may now state that a certain pair of predicates is contradictory, but we cannot use this con-
tradiction to deduce that either one or the other holds. However, since NAF predicates are
52Secondary Predication in Russian
constantly present in the background, they are modeled as permanent hypotheses in any frame-
work. Therefore we shall not write them out explicitly. Any predicate
 
 
 
  can have a NAF
version, which will be notated as
￿
 
 
 
 . We may now tentatively propose a theory of linking
rules.
(86)
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Note that the last two constraints may be called uniqueness of realization, for obvious reasons.
Another point worth mentioning: we must explain a number of relations simultaneously, which
amounts to explaining a conjunction. The net effect under the deﬁnition of explanation is that
constraints must be used for all explanations to check their explainability, defaults as well. This
has as a consequence that we always have a choice between a default and its negation by failure,
ifthedefaultsispresent. Assuminganegationasfailurehypothesisinonepart oftheexplanation
of a conjunct blocks any positiveinstance of the default which might be needed in the other part.
Before we see how this theory works we have to say something about the situation type cut. The
working hypothesis is that the situation schemata of cutting allow only the agent to be ignored,
and the situation type requires the theme to always be realized, either as a direct object, or as
a subject, disjointly. The subject realization is only allowed under special condition peculiar to
all middles, but which we shall ignore for simplicity here. We use a small ad hoc theory for this
case. We let cut be subcategorized for the direct object. If the subcategorization requirement
is not met, the classical negation of the corresponding predicate is put the list of facts reﬂect-
ing role of syntax. In this case the NAF of defaults is used to explicitly reject some default
interpretations.
We enter the context of interpretation of the verb
 . Note that different variables in a formula
allow different discourse referents instantiate them in this formula simultaneously. This is re-
quired.
(87)
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Now let us trace out the interpretation of (78a) to see how the theory works. The structure
of(78a) is basically (88).
(88) PrP
DP
 
 
℄
John
Pr
0
Pr
0 VP
VP
DP
 


℄
the paper
V
0
 
 
℄
cut
PP
with the knife
 
 
℄
We havean abductivetask(89)withsyntacticfacts and relationsto beexplained. Wespecify that
  is the outer context, and
  is the starting context of interpretation. The relation
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
gets interpreted via the semantic form


 
 
 
 
 
 
 .
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 canbeinterpretedaccordingto(87)via
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Let us check whether this is indeed so. There is only one lifting rule applicable in case of


 
 
 
 
 
 
 ,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . We mustchooseit to beable toproduce an explanationlater.
This blocks the explanation of
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  via
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , by the uniqueness of realiza-
tion. Westillhavetwo options, via
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 and via
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 .
However we have only one option to explain
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 , i.e. via
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 


 
 
 . By
uniqueness we cannot use
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . So we must use
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 .
Consider now (78b), and ignore the adverbial. On entering the context of the verb
  we have
now
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(90)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
f
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
:
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
g
 
 
 
;
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
Three options are present here: agentive reading, instrumental reading and thematic reading.
Remember that we assumed that any situation scheme of cutting has some predicate which gets
lifted to


 
 
￿
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 . So we must enforce the use of


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
  in any explanation.
The theme is either an object or a subject. If there is no object, all alternative realizations of
the subject are blocked via the constraints, since these enforce the use of NAF-contradictories
during checking consistency. We are left with only one possible interpretation of the subject.
Consider now (78c). We have an object here, hence the theme is realized. One of the two
possible interpretations of the subject is via the instrument default.
These examples were intended to show the work of the third component of the interpretation.
With this we may proceed to explore the semantics of secondary predication in Russian.
4 The semantics of secondary predication in Russian: case
studies
4.1 Basic semantics of SP and the absence of resultatives in Russian
There are a number of proposals concerning the formal semantic structure of secondary predi-
cation. We consider the analysis proposed by Rothstein (Rothstein, 2000, 2001) in a series of
papers to be themost promising. In theﬁrst subsectionwe willintroduceit and sketch a proposal
of explanation of the absence of resultatives in Russian in the next section.
Recall that resultative secondary predication like (91) is exhibited by structures like (92), cf.
Bowers (1997).
(91) John cut the stick short.
(92) PrP
DP
John
 
 
℄
Pr
0
Pr
0 VP
DP
 
 
℄
the stick
V
0
V
0
 
 
 
℄
cut
PrP
Pro
 
 
℄ Pr
0
Pr
0 AP
 
 
 
℄
short
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These structures suggest that resultative-SP are complex predicates. There are two basic vari-
ations on this theme: the complex resultative predicates are formed in the lexicon or they are
formed in the syntax. The ﬁrst line is exempliﬁed by the work of Kaufman and Wunderlich
(Kaufmann and Wunderlich, 1998; Wunderlich, 1997), the second by the work of Rothstein
cited above and Winkler (Winkler, 1997). We consider Bowers’ proposal at least compatible
with the second line of analysis.
4.1.1 Rothstein’s analysis of resultatives and Russian
Rothstein considers the relation between the primary and the secondary predicates be based
on the generalized conjunction proposed by Laserson (Laserson, 1992). This is in line with
our intuitive catalog of the properties of secondary predication from section 1.1. Given two
predicates,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  and
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  generalized conjunction yields
 
 
 
 
9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
￿
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
according to Rothstein. But the operation of secondary predication is not pure conjunction, and
is subject to additional requirements. First, the temporal course of the event
 
  must be included
in the temporal course of
 
 . Second,
 
  and
 
  must share one participant. Given this, (93)
(93) John drove the car drunk
gets the interpretation in (94), where
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  is something like x is the bearer of state e.
(94)
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Resultatives differ from depictives insofar as the secondary predicate, though conjoined with
the matrix event, refers rather to its culmination, i. e. the relation is
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 . Note that


 
  is a structuring function: given
 , either there is a unique


 
 
 
 
  or it is undeﬁned. Whenever it is deﬁned, there are at least two
events which may be referred to by the summing operation. Rothstein, however, does not want
to postulate two different constraint conditions on generalized conjunction, one for depictives
and one for resultatives. She suggests that the occurrence of


 
  in the constraint condition is
implicit: that this argument can be either the whole event or its culmination is because we only
have two events available in the structure of the primary predication event: the activity event and
the culmination of the main predication event she calls the becoming event. The activity event
can only give rise to the depictive reading which is equivalent to the depictive reading based on
the primary predication event itself, according to Rothstein. So the real difference is between
the case where the constraint mentions the temporal trace of the culmination the matrix event
and the one where the temporal trace of the the whole matrix event is relevant. Example (95)
then has the interpretation in (96).
(95) John cut the stick short
(96)
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Two questions are to be asked before we can proceed. First, how does the generalized conjunc-
tion gets access to the culmination of the main predication event? Second, how does the result
interpretation come from the mere conjunction?
Rothstein assumes that the structure of events which give rise to resultative interpretation of
secondary predication is given by
9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
￿
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , where
 
 
  specify
the relation between
 
  and
 
 . The requirement for the generalized conjunction seems to be
that it picks out some event predicate which is available in the VP. A technical solution is in
order here, because verbs which support resultatives are not usually taken to be predicates of
three event variables. Suppose we have found a solution. How do we get the result reading in
(96)? For that matter, what is a result reading and what is a result?
We want to make as few assumptions and make them as uncontroversial as possible. On a pre-
theoretical level a result is an eventuality (an event or a state, but in our case clearly a state)
which has at least the following three characteristics, in our understanding:
(97)
￿ (a) it is initiated by an event
￿ (b) the association between the event and the result has some systematicity
￿ (c) there is some (not just statistic) connection between the two
These characterization is very weak, of course, but it allows us to make two tentative assump-
tions. First, the (b) and (c) aspects can be reﬂected presumably at the level of situation scheme,
but hardly at the level of situation type. Second, the (a) aspect gives us a formal structure of
results which can be reﬂected in situation types.
(98) A result is a state
 
 
 
 
 
  such that
9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
℄
provided (97b) and (97c) hold
Here
  is the individual by virtue of which the state referent is in the situation scheme at all. We
are speciﬁcally interested in event discourse referents which originate as arguments in situation
schemata and situation types. We thus have two options: the
  in (98) comes either as the event
argument of the verb in the context of verb interpretation, or as one of the event arguments in
the context of situation scheme. In the ﬁrst case it is introduced as a sole argument of the verb,
and therefore the predicate
 
 
 
 
 
  expressing the result could be found in the syntax and have
roughly the semanticform
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . In the second case the predicate would only
be part of a situation scheme description because the initiating event is unavailable as a syntactic
index. Since we see no reason to prohibit it, we opt for the ﬁrst part of the alternative. Notice
that
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  is the abstract representation of a result. It is not yet a result, since there might
be pairs
 
 
 
 
  satisfying the predicate
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  where we would hesitate that the state is
a result of the event. Take, for instance, Newton’s apple. It is the description of the situation
scheme instantiating the type that provides the missing factors which are therefore implied by
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  within the situation scheme. We restrict ourselves only to the level of situation types
at this point, however.
Since Rothstein does not use
 
 
 
 , let us switch to her terminology. The fact that


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
holds in
9
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 , where
  is a state, does
not necessarily express that
  is a result of
 . We have to infer also in Rothstein’s treatment that
57Anatoli Strigin and Assinja Demjjanow
  is not just any state which happens to temporally contain the temporal trace of the culmination
of
 , but a special state. Now what makes it special? The fact that


 
 
 
 
  is deﬁned is due to
the structure of the predicate in the extension of which
  is asserted to be. The predicate should
be telic (the property, which we will discuss in the next subsection). The culminations of the
events of such predicates manifest the states of their respective arguments which come about as
consequencesoftheevents. Therefore, culminationsshouldbeinstantaneous,oratleastcoincide
with the beginning of the resulting state. But that the state expressed by the secondary predicate
is asserted to be the resulting state must be due to the tacit assumption that the temporary trace
inclusion between a culmination and a state is always interpreted as asserting a result state. We
can then try to convert this reasoning to our framwork.
The structure
9
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￿
 
 
 
 
  plays the role similar
to our
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . The resultative aspects of both of these relations must be stated somewhere
else. Though we avoid using the notion of culmination, we can express the resulting states of
the same events. If there are other uses for


 
 , they play no role in the semantics of secondary
predication, sowe considerthetwo approaches to beequivalenthere. We see thereforeno reason
converting the analysis of Rothstein for our purposes to be able to use
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 .
Now what consequences does this treatment have for Russian, where resultatives do not oc-
cur? We have potentially two approaches to the absence of resultative secondary predicates in
Russian:
￿ the
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  relation is not accessible for interpretation at the syntactic position of verb
argument in Russian
￿ the inference to
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  at this position, although available in principle, is blocked for
some semantic or pragmatic reason.
We do not want to assume that the syntactic construction is unavailable for syntactic reasons,
since Russian knows argument small clauses of the kind I consider him a fool. And we see no
reasons to maintain that there is a syntactic feature which blocks the access to culminations or
prohibits the occurrence of
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , respectively. Rather, we think that structures of secondary
predication occurring in Russian at the position where they may get this interpretation simply
do not get it. Given Rothstein’s view that resultative secondary predication is actually com-
plex predicate formation, it can refer to the structure of the main predication event. Therefore
we think that actually only the second way of explaining the absence of resultatives in Russian
remains. In other words, something blocks one interpretation of a perfectly legitimate construc-
tion.
4.1.2 On the absence of resultative secondary predicates in Russian
We offer the following explanation of how this happens: Russian, but not English or German
codes results of events in situation types. This coding is therefore lexical in Russian. It is also
used by verbal preﬁxation. Verbal preﬁxation of simplex verbs (which are imperfective in Rus-
sian) produces telic predicates expressing results. Preﬁxation provides additional information
about the results, and this information is associated with speciﬁc verb classes. Resultative sec-
ondary predication in English is not coded in the situation types and does not depend on the
verb class. This distinguishes between complex predicate formation and preﬁxation. Preﬁxed
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verbs in Russian are already resultatives, with class-speciﬁc semantics. Imperfective verbs in
Russian cannot be made telic via quantization, since they induce a particular sense shift of their
arguments which are in general not quantized. Since they remain atelic the culmination func-
tion is not deﬁned for them and no structure supporting a resultative reading arises. Thus, if
the interpretation of the syntactic frame of secondary predication could be made resultative via
complex predicate formation in Russian, it would compete with the preﬁxation interpretation
strategy for telic (perfective) verbs and fail for the simplex imperfective verbs. The preﬁxation
interpretation strategy would win, since it plays an additional role for each verb class. Hence the
interpretation of resultative SP is mostly blocked in Russian. And since it is mostly blocked, it
is of very limited value for this language. We will expand this argument point by point now.
In order to give this argument we must ﬁrst distinguish between telic predicates in general and
resultative predicates. The literature on the notion of telicity is by now too vast to be reviewed
here. The notion is believed to play a great role in describing the semantics of verb phrases and
a number of grammatic reﬂexes of this semantics in various languages, (Krifka, 1989, is a good
reference). The crucial point about the events of telic predicates is, to speak with Krifka (1998),
that ”...they require some time till they are completed.” Any event in the extension of such a
predicate reaches the point of completion. And there are different kinds of such points. Krifka
(1998) notes that it does not make sense to classify events themselves into telic and atelic since
one and the same event may be in the extension of both a telic and an atelic predicate. Thus, one
and the same event may be described as running, i. e. by an atelic predicate, or by running a
mile, i. e. a telic predicate which is true only of events which are events of running a mile. It is
rather predicates or event types which have the property of telicity, (99).
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An event predicate is telic, if it applies only to events
  such that all the parts of
  that fall under
  are initial and ﬁnal parts of
 . Of course, we do not ’see’ how the events in the extension of
a telic predicate are completed, but if we have a suitable description of completion, the events
do indeed group into a predicate. So, conceptually, each telic predicate must be associated with
such a description. Note that the state in which this description holds true is a result state in our
terminology. In Krifka’s example above, providing a spatial bound on events amounts to such a
description. One result of running a mile is a state in which the mile has been covered.
One point should be emphasized here. Krifka (1998) intends the algebraic structures used as
models ”...to be attempts to capture certain properties of the way we see the world, not as at-
tempts to describe the world how it is” (p. 198). So, at least in principle, two different languages
may”see theworld”somewhatdifferently, butat least onalarger scaleequivalentlyto thedegree
which excludes that one of them is a selectional hazard, evolutionary speaking.
Consider the question whether resultatives are telic under (99) on our approach. Suppose we
postulate that if an event
  with the bearer
  initiates the state
  so that our intuitive description
of results is satisﬁed, does this state constitute the completion description of a telic predicate?
Consider building a house until it is ﬁnished. If we allow only the temporally maximal events
of building a house until completion to be in the extension, we have a telic predicate. If we
also allow temporally non-maximal events, we violate the deﬁnition. Yet why should we not
take the event of working on this house which does not contain the initial part of the maximal
event, but contains its culmination and declare it also to be an event of building a house until
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it is completed? One could answer that this is cheating, since we leave out a piece of work.
But perhaps the resort to the maximality condition is dictated not so much by justice as by
linguistic regimentation. So, if some language grammaticalizes telicity, the result predicates
must be deﬁned only on maximal events to qualify as telic18. Can it happen that non-maximal
events are nevertheless useful?
Consider one way English expresses telicity. The pattern is well-known: a verb denotes a cumu-
lative predicate which may become telic if the thematic argument of the verb is quantized. Thus,
John walked and John walked a mile exhibit exactly this distinction: walked is atelic, walked a
mile is telic. John ate two apples is telic, John ate apples is atelic. This can be proved, and since
we shall need the proof in a moment, let us introduce some deﬁnitions and show the proof (they
are from Krifka (1998)). Part-structures are latices as deﬁned in section 3.2.2.
(100)
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(101)
  is quantized in a part-structure
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Krifka has long since proposed that English, and German, and perhaps many other if not all
languages deﬁne the incremental theme relation between an event and its bearer as a bijection
which preserves the part-of structure. An incremental theme is something which is subjected to
or undergoes a change part by part under he mereological part-of relation. If this is accepted,
then we can prove that John ate two apples is telic. Here is the proof, which is based on the
important assumption that the predicate
 
 
 
 
 
 
  is quantized.
￿ assumethecontrary, i.e. thatthereareentities
 
 
 
 
 
 suchthat
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￿ we introduce the corresponding objects
  and
 , obtaining
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￿ since the relation between the second and the third arguments is a bijection for ﬁxed
 
which preserves the part-of structure, we have
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￿ again by the fact that it is a bijection we have
 
 
 
￿ hence
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
￿ This contradicts our assumption that
 
 
 
 
 
 
  is quantized.
Now let us return to Russian and consider example (102)
(102) dˇ zon jel jabloko
John ate-imperf apple-acc
John ate/was eating an apple
18We should, of course, be able to provide a solution to the imperfective paradox: John is painting the hose red
does not necessarily imply that the result state is achieved.
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Russian seems to behave similarly, with a slight variation that it has two big verb classes, the
simplex verbs called imperfective (we mark with imperf) and the preﬁxed verbs, which are
considered to be perfective, (we mark withperf). Simplex verbs are usually treated as atelic
(cumulative), preﬁxed verbs as telic. Yet there are some disturbing dissimilarities as far as their
behavior is concerned compared to English. This difference is reﬂected in the double translation
of the verb in the above examples.
Russian imperfective beˇ zat’ (run) is indifferent to the addition of a path description. Dˇ zon beˇ zal
(odnu) milu (John ran a mile) does not become telic and does not really entail that John ﬁnished
running a mile after having ran a mile. He could have perfectly well stopped in the middle,
and the sentence would remain true. What counts is the description of the event: John must be
running with the intention of covering a mile. Russian imperfective simplex verbs in the past
form often behave similarly to English progressive, though they deﬁnitely not have the same
semantic constraints on their use in discourse19 This kind of behavior is general in the combina-
tion of a imperf-verb with the quantized theme argument. In English, the predicate eat an apple
is telic, similarly to eat two apples, in Russian est’ jabloko is not: it is unspeciﬁed, whether the
eater consumed the apple, or even whether s/he intends to do it. What is important is that the
event of eating be located ’within the bounds of an apple’. True enough, imperfectives cease
to be cumulative with quantized arguments. But they do not become telic. Thus, quantization
makes no prediction about the result, and imperfectives do not show resultative interpretation
with quantized arguments.
But quantization of the arguments fails to always produce telicity even under preﬁxation, though
it is often assumed that Russian verb preﬁxation produces verbs which are telic. Demjjanow
(1998), p. 80 noted that simplex verbs when preﬁxed with po- (the so-called pofective) are not
cumulative, but remain divisive, i. e. true of the parts of the event, if true of the event itself.
Hence they are not telic. They also display the behaviorof imperfectiveverbs. Filip (2000)gives
the following general description of the meaning of this preﬁx: ”The preﬁx po contributes to the
verb the ...meaning of a small quantity or a low degree
  of the event - Dem./Str.
  relative to
some expectation value....” The paper contains a thoroughgoing discussion of the observation
that
In sharp contrast to most perfective verbs, po-verbs are not acceptable in time-span
adverbials, and they behave like imperfective verbs in that they freely co-occur with
durative adverbials.
The reason for the divisivity is clear: any part of the event which is a small amount of, e.g.,
walking is also a small amount of walking. Filip comes to the conclusion that the semantics
of perfectivization in Russian, though connected with telicity, is not based on the same mecha-
nisms as in English. Similarly, Demjjanow (1998) concludes that it is impossible to identify the
perfective/imperfective partition of verbs in Russian with telicity/atelicity.
We may tentatively conclude that similarity in the deviations from the telic/atelic pattern with
quantized/homogeneous arguments and under preﬁxation by some preﬁxes in Russian both in-
dicate that Russian somehow deviates from English in its view on the reality. What is the differ-
ence?
19Thus, it is common to hear Ty ˇ ctal etu knigu?, but it is strange to translate this with Were you reading this
book?. The normal interpretation would be like Have you read this book?. But in Russian Da, no ne do konza –
Yes, but not to the end. – is a felicitous answer.
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A closer inspection of the proof of the quantization property of the cumulative predicate with a
quantized argument above suggests that we could give up cumulativity of the base predicates,
the homomorphism condition on the incremental theme relation, or quantization condition for
nominal predicates. We see no reason to giveup the ﬁrst two. So theonly assumptionto go is the
quantization assumption for nominal predicates like two apples. It could be substituted for by
the following assumption which we call Finite bounds. The move seems worth while exploring
20:
(103) Finite bounds:
In Russian, countable nominal predicates of objects treat objects
in the context of imperfective verbs as small ﬁnite bounded lat-
tices with the top element being the object itself, and apply to the
parts, if they apply to the top element.
Two remarks could be useful in this connection. First, there is a kind of non-compositionality
present here. But actually it is spurious, because is can be regarded as a sense shift (or regular
polysemy), cf. Apresjan (1973), Nunberg (1995), Copestake and Briscoe (1995) and Strigin
(1998). Second, we obtain an elegant way of expressing incompleteness if we allow parts of
the object be potential, in the sense that they can be realized in some course of development of
the present situation, but are not realized yet. Note that under this assumption an object
  on
this reading of nouns is a lattice which has a top element. We can therefore use
 
 
 
 
 
  as a
function denoting this element.
The ﬁnite bounds assumption makes it impossible for the imperfective verbs in Russian to have
quantized arguments. We thus account to the fact that for most imperfective verbs there is no
implication that only the whole object, i. e. the top element of this ﬁnite lattice is meant to
undergo the change expressed by the verb. Eating an apple in Russian is eating only its parts
as much as eating the apple itself. So est’ jabloko (eat-imperf apple) means to eat pieces of
apple, and only perhaps the whole apple. Building a house encompasses building its parts, and
only perhaps the whole structure. Washing a dish is washing its parts, and perhaps the whole
dish. Unless the verb requires the whole object (i.e. the top of the part structure), we are free to
assume that we may be dealing with its parts only. With this assumption (102) is explained.
The ﬁnite bounds assumption is however only the beginning. Pragmatic constraints on the use
of imperfectives are needed for ﬁnite bounds to function properly. Thus, for instance, eating two
apples can seldom be described as being in the process of eating simply parts of two apples, and
the combination of dva jabloka (two apples) with an imperfective est’ (eat) sounds somewhat
odd. But it is OK, if the eating of the two apples is conceivable as being done simultaneously.
Also, if we explicitly express he idea that no top elements are involved, the imperfective is
possible, cf. (104).
(104) on jel dva jabloka i ni odno ne dojel
he ate two apples but not one not ﬁnished eating
He was eating/ate? two apples, but did not ﬁnish even one
There is another, related, observation which could be perhaps explained using ﬁnite bounds. A
perfective verb like sjel (ate up) can be used in sjel jabloko (ate up an/the apple) with the object
20Under the deﬁnition of part structures, a structure with a ﬁnite number of elements always has the top element,
which is the sum of all the parts of the structure.
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in the accusative case, or sometimes with the object in the genitive case, sjel (nemnogo) jabloka
(ate up - a bit of - an apple). The latter form indicates that only part of the apple has been eaten
up21. Genitive case with the imperfective, e. g. *jel jabloka is unacceptable, unless the verb is
negated ne jel jabloka. It can be assumed that genitive in this use always signals the exclusion
of the top of the ﬁnite object lattice22 and this would support our hypothesis that imperfective
is normally associated with the objects which are not required to be the top of the ﬁnite object
hierarchy: genitive with the imperfective is in general redundant.
Let us now return to the question of results. If the addition of a quantized argument to a verb
denoting a cumulative predicate fails to produce a resultative reading of this verb, how does
Russian go about expressing results at all, if there are no resultativesecondary predicates either?
Demjjanow (1998) suggested that the important notion in the semantics of Russian verbs is that
of a state which is either terminated or initiated by the event (in our present terminology). Her
main idea is as follows: any of the 28-30 verbal preﬁxes introduces either one of these states
or even both of them as its formal, underspeciﬁed meaning, or sometimes as a presupposed
characteristics, together with some other aspects which constitute the lexical meaning of the
preﬁx. The speciﬁcation of this formal meaning depends on the preﬁx and on the verb class23.
Demjjanow assumed that the relation which we now call either init or term is one single, weakly
causative relation. Though we now think that the terminated and the initiated states differ in
their status, we would like to keep this intuitive characteristics of init. The connection to telicity
arises because the inclusion of the terminated or initiates state produces a telic predicate on the
assumption that the whole object is affected.
In terms of our present model of semantics, if a situation scheme contains any relation which
implies init or term, the latter must appear in the situation type and they appear there by virtue
of a preﬁx. The verb becomes perfective. Roughly, a preﬁx introduces an additional condition
on the event argument, perhaps in terms of its bearer, i. e. something like
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , where
  is related to
  in some way,
 
 
 
 
 
 
  a condition to be speciﬁed under
a particular preﬁx, and
 
 
 
 
 
  is the lowest upper bound of
 , i. e. the whole object. So, if
preﬁxation concerns the theme, we have an analogue of the telic predicate. Preﬁxation quantizes
nominal predicates.
Since verb preﬁxation in Russian is word formation and, consequently, happens outside of the
syntax proper (a standard opinion), the variables of the preﬁx should be the same as the relevant
variables in the verb interpretation context. Thus, preﬁxation is context specialization, i. e.
we get a new context of verb interpretation. There may even be a number of such contexts for
some verbal preﬁxes in Russian. Demjjanow (1998) argues that the additional meanings of the
terminated or initiated states which depend on the verb are speciﬁed for these contexts relative
to classes of verbs, and not so much for single verbs, though some verbs may themselves specify
these meanings for particular preﬁxes, ignoring the class speciﬁcation. Thus, the verb sjest’ (eat
up) could specify its additional semantics for the preﬁx s via a class of food consumption verbs.
21TheacademicGrammaroftheRussian Language(Vinogradovetal., 1952)givesthefollowingcharacterization
of this use: a direct object can be marked with genitive case, if only part of the object is affected by the process
expressed by the verb. In this function it is called genitive of the part or partitive genitive. Curiously enough the
grammar does not mention that it can occur only with the imperfective.
22The genitive of negation
23Filip (2000) also notes this contextual dependency ”...the basic accumulative and attenuative meanings
< of
the preﬁxes na and po - Dem./Str.
> are manifested in a variety of ways, depending on the lexical semantics of the
classes of base verbs with which na and po combine, and on the linguistic and extra-linguistic context.”, p. 48
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The meaning of s is very general, probably simply requiring the incremental theme of the verbs
be
 
 
 , hence the whole object consumed. As there are not so many such verbs which take s,
it is also conceivable that they have direct connection to the preﬁx, an not via some special class.
On the other hand Demjjanow (1998) showed that the preﬁx pere- is sensitive to at least three
different classes of verbs, specifying its core semantics depending on the class.
Let us return to our example (95) and its Russian counterpart in (105).
(105) Petr u-rezal palku
Peter shorter-cut-perf stick
Peter cut the stick shorter
The Grammar of Modern Russian Literary Language (ˇ Svedova, 1970) names ”to diminish (it-
self) by the action named by the motivatingverb” among the eight plus meanings of the preﬁx u.
Which is the meaning it is used here, making the Russian sentence correspond pretty closely to
the English counterpart. The verb rezat’ has here the same meaning, as cut, but is in the perfec-
tive, with the resultative interpretation that the stick became shorter as the result of cutting. This
can be characterized by an abductive framework like (106). We consider this to be the context in
which u has the ”lessening” meaning, and call it
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 . This context must be entered from
the verb interpretation context, and exited therein.
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The measure
  depends on the verb class, on the individual verb, and on the dimension of the
object which the operation of cutting is applied to. We may assumethat specializing contexts are
only useful, if their defaults are used. Therefore we made
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  a default.
If this default is not applicable, the context is dropped and unavailable for interpretation.
The representation, and most of the properties of the Russian verb rezat’ are similar to those of
cut, so we may use the same situation type, i. e. consider (87) to be the abductive framework
for rezat’, too. Any verb can be taken to specialize a verbal preﬁx context, so the application of
the preﬁx results in the component-wise uniﬁcation of the two abductive frameworks, i. e. the
conditions on the contexts, the hypotheses and the facts. The interpretation by default is that the
whole object of cutting becomes smaller as a result of cutting.
Now, according to our explanation proposal, the interpretation option which is available in En-
glish, the one via secondary predication, is blocked in Russian. In order to be able to compare
the interpretation strategies for resultatives in Russian and in English we need an abductive
framework for English resultative secondary predication. But since we already discussed the
proposal by Rothstein, we will simply use its intuitive adaptation here, and reformulate it in the
next section, where depictives are treated. We assumed that the resultative interpretation needs
one more addition to the semantics proposed by Rothstein. This addition is rendered in (107).
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What does his mean for Russian? If this is the requirement for resultative secondary predica-
tion, it is clear that


 
 
 
 
  is undeﬁned for imperfective verbs, because there is no requirement
that their themes be restricted to TOP. Hence the resultative interpretation for them would be
impossible. For perfective verbs


 
 
 
 
  is deﬁned, but then we have two interpretations which
entail results. The preﬁxed interpretation explains
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  by an internal hypothesis of the
verb interpretation, since exiting the context of preﬁxation we are again in the context of the
situation type. The secondary predicate interpretation,which is also hypothetical, like any other
interpretation, is an add-on from the syntax.
From here it is possible to argue that since preﬁxation is applicable in cases where secondary
predication is not, viz. the case of imperfective verbs, and for preﬁxed verbs it can potentially
lead to conﬂicts with the meaning of a preﬁx, hence of limited use, preﬁxation wins the com-
petition. A more detailed explanation could probably be attempted in terms of bidirectional
optimality theory Blutner (2000). This appears to be a promising direction of research. Alter-
natively, we may speculate on some ranking measure for explanations in abductive frameworks
which could adequately express the above argument. But this seems at present to be a more
distant perspective. We hope to be able to examine both directions in later work.
With this we may no turn to Russian speciﬁc instances of secondary predication. Remember
that Russian has depictives, so for them the basic semantics is the one proposed by Rothstein.
4.2 Russian-speciﬁc instances of secondary predication
4.2.1 Basic semantics of SP: depictives in Russian
We thus use the idea of Susan Rothstein (Rothstein, 2000) that secondary predicates introduce
a new eventuality (more like a state than like an event) which has at least one participant in
common with the participants of the event of the modiﬁed clause. Moreover, the temporal trace
of the event in the main clause should be included in the temporal trace of the eventuality in-
troduced by the secondary predicate. In transforming this proposal into an abductive framework
we should keep in mind that the semantics of secondary predication must be partitionable in
two parts: the internal semantics of the predicative and the external semantics of the adjunct
relation. The latter relates the internal semantics to the semantics of the modiﬁed clause. We
assume this external semantics to be associated with the syntactic construction and not with any
particular lexical item. But it is certainly possible to chose an implementation which ties the
external semantics to some syntactic feature in the predicative adjunct.
It may probably be assumed that the adjunct relation is standardly interpreted as generalized
conjunction, so this will be the constructional or external meaning of the secondary predication.
We must then take care of the two additional constraints which characterize the semantics of
SP on Rothstein’s view. The common participant arises automatically via the control of the
 
 
 -subject from the matrix clause, and therefore need not be postulated in the syntactic model
we’ve chosen. The temporal inclusion relation between the temporal traces of the eventualities
should be postulated. This seems to be indeed the hallmark of the secondary predication.
Let us consider the external semantics ﬁrst. The generalized conjunction conjoins clauses, i. e.
takes two event contexts, and produces a new context with a new event discourse referent. The
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predication phrase
 
 
  is not selected. This can be reﬂected in its status, e. g. with the help of
some feature. Assume this feature is
 
 . It is interpreted as the temporal inclusion for temporal
trace functions, and we can also use it to the context of the SP interpretation of the generalized
conjunction. We also need the semantic form predicate, which interprets the syntactic adjunct
relation. Call this predicate again
 
 
 
 
 


 . But this predicate has now an argument which
introduces a marked context
 
 , so we have a three-place predicate
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  and
the name of the context
 
 
 
 
 
 . Thus, the secondary predication adjunct is interpreted by the
following abductive framework.
(108)
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The importing conventions will ensure that the abductive frameworks of
 
  and
 
  will be
imported component-wise. This is the external semantics of the secondary predication.
The internal semantics depends on the nature of the secondary predicate and on the antecedent
of the subject. The choice of the antecedent is the semantics of control.
4.2.2 The semantics of
 
 
  and the hypothesis of Jakobson.
It seems thatthere aretwo factors whichinﬂuence thechoiceofthediscoursereferent whichis to
bethereferent of
 
 
 . Theﬁrst factorare thestandard mechanismsofsyntacticcontrolof
 
 
 ,
e. g. the c-command condition. We will abbreviate this case by the predicate


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
computable on syntactic representations. The second factor is the membership in the group of
discourse referents which are not mapped to the close syntactic environment of the verb. We
would like to speculate that, unless something prohibits it, any discourse referent of this group
may be the referent of
 
 
 . This case will be abbreviated by
 
 
 
 
 , and we will have more to
say about it in a moment. In both cases the core of the semantics of
 
 
  is simply an equation
between discourse referents, e. g. (109).
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Note that the context of
  must be marked as
 
 . This requirement would not allow the even-
tuality variable of the main verb to be picked up, after the resources of the context are imported
into a broader context of verb interpretation.
This solution may be called implicit control. Normally, a discourse referent which stands in
some thematic relation with the verb is realized overtly by a DP. DP adjuncts, if these exist,
are not taken to stand in thematic relations with the verb. The idea formalized in (109) is as
follows: a discourse referent which is thematically related to the verb may sometimes be not
realized overtly, i. e. mapped to a DP, but can nevertheless be an implicit antecedent of
 
 
 .
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What seems to be a thematically non-related adjunct DP is actually a predicate of a thematically
related discourse referent.
The ﬁrst implication of the abductive framework
 
  states that as long as discourse referent
 
introduced by a DP which


￿


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . it may be its antecedent. But the second clause
involves this curious set of discourse referents
 
 
 
 
  which are visible phonologically only
via their predicates. According to the second implication they may also serve as antecedents
of
 
 
 . As long as the secondary predicates follow the observation of Jespersen and pattern
with the primary predicates, the result is actually semantically equivalent to the case when these
discourse referents are realized by their own phonologically visible DP. Things become difﬁcult
for the hypothesis of implicit control when the DPs in the secondary predication construction
are predicates which do not occur felicitously in primary predication construction. These are, e.
g., strong quantiﬁers like every (Partee, 1987, contains the hypothesis explaining this behavior
which we endorse here). We would like to retain Jespersen’s generalization that secondary pred-
icates are no different from primary predicates. We will discuss this property while reviewing
the uses of Russian instrumental.
Now what are the discourse referents with the property
 
 
 
 
 ?
Jakobson(1936)(reprintedinJakobson(1984))dividesallcaseformsofRussianintotwogroups
which he termed full case and peripheral case (Jakobson, 1984, p. 78).
”‘...I will call the I
 nstrumental
  and the D
 ative
  peripheral cases and the
N
 ominativ
  and the A
 ccusativ
  full cases, and for the opposition between the
two types I will use the designation status-correlation [Stellungskorrelation] in
what follows. A peripheral case indicates that its referent occupies a peripheral
status in the overall semantic content of the utterance, while a full case indicates
nothingabout such astatus. A periphery presupposesa center; aperipheral casepre-
supposes the presence of a central point in the content of the utterance, which
the peripheral case helps determine...Iwould liketo emphasizethat what is speciﬁc
to the peripheral cases is not that they indicate the presence of the two points in the
utterance, but only that they render one peripheral with respect to the other.”’
We will not attempt to explicate notions like Stellungskorrelation or periphery, but only use the
partitioning. What is important in this partition is that the distinction is based not so much on
the semantic properties of arguments, as on their status in the semantic representation, so that
if they are important at all, then as a semantic or a pragmatic motivation for being classiﬁed in
either way. It should be emphasized that according to Jakobson, if an argument gets assigned, e.
g. instr instead of nom, this assignment is made sometimes in accordance with the point of view
of the speaker on the entire situation, i.e. the assignment can depend on the conventionalized
intention of the speaker to make some referent peripheral, if there is a choice. We therefore
will assume that the speakers of Russian partition the discourse referents of the situation scheme
characteristics into two groups: the core and the periphery. Secondary predication characterizes
one part of the periphery.
We will say that a case is assigned to some discourse referent, if there is an explanation of the
semanticform of the sentence by which it is associated with the syntactic positionmarked by the
case. Full cases are assigned by hypothetical reasoning basically to the terms of the argument
relations. But the instrumental is a peripheral case, and is assigned mostly to non-arguments.
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Which means that we have a classiﬁcation of the cases as a – perhaps formal – part of the
semantic-syntactic interface, cf. (110). Here we explicitly mention the N(egation)A(s)F(ailure)-
hypothesis
￿
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This is a small case assignment theory. It works as follows. Both NOM and ACC are full
cases represented as predicates based on feature sets which are due to the effects of syntac-
tic operations. This classiﬁcation of these predicates is a fact, i. e. it cannot be dropped or
changed in the task of explanation. But we also need a default to the effect that full cases
are only those which are explicitly classiﬁed as such. To do this we hypothesize that all the
cases are peripheral, unless something contradicts it. The preﬁx
￿ here is a kind of nega-
tion, because the predicates
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
  and
￿
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
  are incompatible, as stated in
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
￿
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
!
?, i. e. their conjunction implies the (always) false propo-
sition
?. But it is a special kind of negation, called negation as failure or NAF 24. Moreover, it
is an abductive formulation of NAF (Kakas et al., 1995). It functions as a default and is always
applied, unless there is an explicit positive case. Now the case
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can never occur, because
￿
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
  is only a hypothesis which cannot be applied when
there is a positive statement, i. e. a full case is present. Furthermore, we do not want to ex-
clude the state of things when there are other peripheral cases, and therefore we assume that
￿
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
! INSTR
 
 
  is only a default, too. What we now achieved is that the individual
arguments
  of
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  or an
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  never belong to the periphery. Other themati-
cally related discourse referents are there simply by exclusion from the group which is assigned
to the full cases. Note that, e. g. ACC
 
 
  is not the name of the case, but only a mnemoni-
cally suggestive predicate. If a direct object gets partitive case assigned, it need not necessarily
fall under this predicate. If we would like to consider this, we should make the assignment of
accusative predicate a default, and perhaps be more explicit is the deﬁnition of our syntactic
relations. Though we made the assignment of accusative to the direct object argument a default,
we do not want do deal with genitive case here, and therefore use the
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


  predicate.
According to this theory, all thediscoursereferents
  which are introduced in thesituationwhich
are not
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
  or
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
  can in principle occur in the instrumental, e. g. a
means of transport referent in a situation which allows for some means of transport, a path
referent in a situation where the verb requires a path, a temporal speciﬁcation, etc., but also a
referent which denotes an instrument. The hypothetical character of the case assignment rule
does not require that they must occur in the instrumental, however. There may be other case
assignment rules or adjunct realizations which compete.
The rest of the paper intends to show how this core semantics may be used in accounting for
other cases of instrumental. We restrict ourselves to basic illustrations and refer the readers to
24Cf. Clark (1978), Nilsson and Maluszy´ nski (1990).
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our papers Demjjanowand Strigin (2000b), Demjjanow and Strigin (2000a) and Demjjanow and
Strigin (2001) for more. In particular, we will skip the derivations and use the DRT format to
represent their results.
4.2.3 Simple adjunct-like SP: path and transport
With this basic semantics we can easily account for two simple uses of instrumental, namely the
instrumental of path in (15l), and the instrumental of means of transport in (15o).
The instrumental of transport is probably the easiest case. If a situation characterized by the
sentence contains the referent for the means of transport, this referent can be hypothetically
taken to be the implicit antecedent of
 
 
  in (109).
(111) On exal poezdom
He drove train-instr
He was going by train
(112)
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Here
 
  is the time of the situation,
 
 ,
 
  are the source and the target locations of the path along
which the movement proceeds,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  speciﬁes that the situation type implicitly
contains a referent for the means of transport. Russian seems to usually treat this referents as a
member of the periphery of the eventuality description. The proposal predicts that the reading
is only possible with situations which already have the appropriate referent. We can check this
prediction in (113).
(113) *On spal poezdom
He slept train-instr
He slept while being transported by train
The sentence is unacceptable. It is of course quite possible to characterize the situation with the
help of a locative PP.
(114) On spal v poezde
He slept in train
He slept on the train
The reason for the difference under our theory is the difference in the interpreting relations:
locatives relate events within the situation to a location, whereas the instrumental of transport
merely marks a predicate which may or may not characterize a means of transport.
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We already noted that the problems with the predication theory for the predicates in the instru-
mental might start where the predicational status of the DP is concerned. The two adjunct-like
uses underdiscussionare actually a conﬁrmation ofour hypothesisin thisrespect. If a quantiﬁed
distributing DP is put into predicational instr, the result is unacceptable, cf. (115). If we manage
to indicate that there is a need for the wide scope of kaˇ zdym poezdom, as in (116), the sentence
becomes acceptable.
(115) *On exal kaˇ zdym poezdom
He went every train-instr
He drove on every train
(116) On exal kaˇ zdym poezdom dva ˇ casa
He went every train-instr for two hours
He drove two hours on every train
Similar effects are known for copula structures in English where quantifying-in gives some
sentences an acceptable interpretation25.
The treatment of the instrumental of path is essentially the same. However, some new points of
interest arise. We have (119) as a partial representation of (118).
(118) On ˇ sel dorogoj
He went road-instr
He was going on the road
(119)
 
j
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
￿
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The availability of the path discourse referent in the representation of the situation is a necessary
prerequisite, as the pair (120) and (121) shows.
(120) On ˇ sel asfaltovoj dorogoj
He went asphalt road-instr
He was going on the asphalt road
25Partee (1987) proposed a number of type-shifting operations to account for the semantic NP-type ambiguities.
None of them would allow a distributive generalized quantiﬁer like every to be a predicate. Examples like (117)
seem to contradict it.
(117) This house has been every color
They motivated Partee to propose that nouns like colour are predicates of those properties which are among the
entities of the domain of type
e of individualsand (117)are cases of quantifying-ininto contexts formingpredicates
out of properties.
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(121)
?
?On spal asfaltovoj dorogoj
He slept asphalt road-instr
He was sleeping on the asphalt road
Although the example (122) seems to contradict this generalization.
(122) On spal dorogoj
He slept road-instr
He was sleeping on the road/way
it can be argued that dorogoj (way-
 
 
 
 
 ) is an adverb. The semantics of this adverb is a gen-
eralization of the part of any situation of movement which contains the referent for the path.26
The accommodation of such an adverb in case of (122) can proceed by extending the represen-
tation of any situation which allows some participant to undergo movement simultaneously with
the main eventuality of the situation. The extension is with that part of the movement situation
which is associated with the adverb.
Quite in parallel to the use of instrumental to mark means of transportation, distributive quan-
tiﬁcation with narrow scope is bad with the instrumental of path, but not in general for paths, as
(123) and (124) show.
(123)
?
?On projexal kaˇ zdym gorodom
He went through every town-instr
He went through every town
(124) On projexal po kaˇ zdomu gorodu
He went through upon every town-dat
He went through every town
4.2.4 The temporal use of the instrumental
The three temporal use of instrumental we would like to distinguish - the fourth type of Nichols,
(13) illustrated in (14) and (125), the one illustrated in (14e), (15m), and that of (15n) present
more difﬁculties.
Let us start with the forth type of Nichols. We assumed that the default mode of combination of
a
 
 
 
 
  with the matrix sentence is that of generalized conjunction. The difﬁculty in (125) is
that although the predication is of the subject, as with depictives, the sentence does not always
assert the simple conjunction of the matrix sentence and the predicate expressed by the
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
together with the temporal restriction on their temporal traces. Intuitively, (125) does not mean
that at some time in the past he was a child and ill, but rather that when he was a child there was
a time or were times when he was ill.
26Isaˇ cenko (1962) noted that, although traditional Russian grammar theory often describes uses of nouns in the
instrumentalcase as adverbsandspeaks of adverbialderivation,in his opinionthis kindofderivationdoes not really
allow to form new adverbs. He proposed to characterize the process of forming occasional adverbs as entstehung
(coming into being, emergence) rather than derivation. Some uses of
D
P
i
n
s
t
r do gradually become adverbialized,
hence reanalyzed syntactically and semantically. Such development is a separate topic of investigation, however.
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(125) Reb’onkom on bolel
Child-instr he ill-past
He was ill as a child
What happens is we seem to restrict our attention to the time at which the secondary predicate is
true, i. e. restrictthesituationtimetothattime, andthenassertthematrixsentencerelativetothis
restricted situation. This assertion relative to a time satisﬁes the temporal inclusion condition.
Nevertheless, we need to consider the information partition status of the secondary predicate in
addition. There are some facts clearly suggesting that this is so.
First, note that from the fact that a person was ill as a child it follows that he was ill at some
time. Now let us add a quantifying adverb to the sentence, e. g. (126).
(126) Reb’onkom on ˇ casto bolel
Child-instr he often ill-past
He was often ill as a child
Clearly, (126) without the secondary predicate does not follow from (126): if someone was
often ill as a child under the circumstances, he need not have been often ill in general under
these circumstances. One view of what is going on is this: the quantiﬁcational adverb needs a
restrictor; we seem to implicitly change the condition which restricts the quantiﬁcational adverb
ˇ casto (often) when we drop the secondary predicate. Therefore we must conclude that the tem-
poral instrumentalsomehow goes into the restrictor clause in the quantiﬁcational structure of the
sentence. But is this structure due to the adverb?
Suppose we use a different temporally dependent noun.
(127) Direktorom on bolel
Director-instr he ill-past
He was ill as a director/whenever he was a director
There may be several periods when the he of (127) was a director which are separated by times
when he was not. Now, what (127) may mean is that at least some times when he was a director
he was ill, but may also mean that each time he was a director he was ill. The second reading is
no longer a conjunction, but rather a conditional. We seem to relativize the assertion that he was
ill to either some or to all relevant periods during which he was a director.
Now we may unify the two kinds of quantiﬁcation to produce (128).
(128) Direktorom on ˇ casto bolel
Director-instr he often ill-past
He was often ill as a director/whenever he was a director
(128) has a reading on which the person was often ill each time he was a director. So the
quantiﬁcational structure which is relevant in the case of the secondary predicate is introduced
by this predicate. We may conclude that the secondary predicate may indeed serve as a temporal
restriction in addition to it being a conjunct. The tripartite conditional structure appears, if we
assume that the secondary predicate is a ﬁnite lattice, and the matrix clause assertion distributes
on this lattice. It should be noted at this point that until this example we did not consider
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abduction on tripartite structures. This extension is very important but complex. Therefore we
will proceed in a more or less intuitionist way, assuming the formalization will give the results
desired.
Second, there is a certain pragmatic implicature in case of (125). This sentence is perfectly OK
only when the person referred to by he is not a child at the time of utterance! Otherwise it is
infelicitous. Thus, (129) is odd on the ”actual state of things”–reading, but OK in the narrative
present use in which the restriction does not coincide with the time of utterance .
(129) Reb’onkom on ˇ casto boleet
Child-instr he often ill-pres
He is often ill as a child
This implicature is unexpected, if we have to do with a simple conjunction. But it can be
explainedby pragmaticfactors, if weassumethat thetemporal intervalprovidedby the predicate
intheinstrumentalshouldplayaroledifferent fromtheoneplayedbythetimeoftheutteranceor
the time of the situation which we assume to be simply a context. If we assume that it restricts
the time of the situation, then, given the time of utterance, it is pragmatically superﬂuous to
restrict the time of the situation to the time of utterance in Russian, since this is the default
interpretation of the present tense.
The temporal restriction by a SP-
 
 
 
 
 
 
  is a kind of presupposition. A denial of the assertion
still refers to the period when the person was a child (130).
(130) On reb’onkom ne bolel
He child-instr not ill was
He was not ill as a child
This fact is reminiscent of Frege’s argument about existential presuppositions of proper names.
Frege argued that if the names were not presupposing their bearers, but rather asserting their
existence, the denial of
(131) Kepler discovered Neptune
would have been equivalent to
(132) Kepler did not discover Neptune, or there was no Kepler.
which is usually not the intended meaning. Similarly with (130) or (133).
(133) On diektorom ne bolel
He director-instr not ill was
He was not ill as a director
The normal interpretation is the one which denies that he was ill when he was a director, and not
the disjunction of the negations.
To develop a representation which may combine the two pieces of evidence we may partition
the situation representation in the restrictor or presupposition part and something like scope or
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assertion part. We adopt insofar the position discussed in Hajiˇ cova et al. (1998) and consider
thatourrepresentations”...involveanoperatorwithtwoargumentsoneofwhich(theRestrictor)
serves in a sense as contributing (part of) the domain relative to which the other argument (the
Nuclear Scope) isinterpreted.”. Thoughwe donot want todeﬁnitivelydescribe suchan operator,
we assume a bipartite structure reﬂecting a restriction and a scope.
This gives us a quantiﬁer-like discourse representation structure for the representation of a
proposition. We reﬂect it by partitioning he representation into two ”boxes”. The restrictor
is the left sub-box, the predication is the right sub-box.
(134)
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If the secondary predicate can distribute over several time spans, we should have the represen-
tation in (135).
(135)
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The represented reading is ”every time he was a director, he was sometimes ill during this
time”. The addition of the adverbs like ˇ casto (often) is straightforward: the tripartite structure
introduced by the adverb replace the box to the right of the implication arrow.
The second temporal use of instrumental illustrated in (136) is representable as (137).
(136) Letom on bolel
Summer-instr he ill
He was ill this summer/in summer
(137)
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The somewhat unexpected, but perfectly justiﬁable assertion
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  simply states that the
second eventuality is characterized as summer. A supporting evidence for this move is the fact
that in Russian nominal sentences like Leto. (Summer.) or Veˇ cer. (Evening.) are quite OK. This
can be treated as a present-tense copula sentence with a null subject which gets the event of the
sentence as its interpretation.
The third temporal use of the instrumental, illustrated here by (138)
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(138) ˇ Casami on ˇ cital
Hour-instr he read
He was reading for hours on end
is connected with the measure use of the instrumental. Measure instrumental was treated in
Demjjanow and Strigin (2001), to which the reader is referred.
5 Summary
The paper made two contributions to semantic typology of secondary predicates, and proposed a
model of semantic interpretation which allowed these contributions to be formulated in the ﬁrst
place.
It assumed a clausal syntax for the secondary predication in Russian. It also considered the in-
strumental case on the secondary predicate to be a reﬂex of the presence of predication phrase,
around which this clause is built, following a number of researchers. The subject of the predica-
tion phrase is considered to be phonetically null, and controllable from the matrix clause.
Starting from these assumptions, the paper developed parts of a semantic model in which the
meaning of the sentence is computed in the context through the use of hypothetical inference
techniques known as abduction.
As a ﬁrst contribution to the typological research the paper provided with the help of this model
an explanation of the fact that Russian has no resultativesecondary predicates. We proposed that
English(and German)differfromRussian intheexpressionoftelicity. Englishusesquantization
of the thematic arguments to express telicity and telicity to express results. Russian does not
quantize its thematic arguments in the imperfective, and uses the representation of results to
express telicity in the perfective aspect. It was shown that the two strategies can be formalized
in the proposed framework. What remains to be done is to provide criteria and the mechanism
of strategy selection which would yield to other applications.
The second contribution of the paper to the typological studies was that it related depictive sec-
ondary predicates in Russian, which usually occur in the instrumental case, to various other uses
of the instrumental case in Russian. It could be shown that inferential contextual speciﬁcation
of an underspeciﬁed meaning can help us to redeﬁne the bounds of secondary predication in
Russian, thus establishing a typological difference in the interpretability of a uniform syntactic
structure in between languages like German and English o the one side and Russian on the other
side. The core difference was proposed to consist in the fact that Russian speakers can reserve
secondary predicates in the instrumentalto characterize a special part of theeventualitystructure
which we called the periphery of the situation scheme, following Jakobson. In principle, SP in
the instrumental can be predicated of any of these referents via the control of the null subject in
the secondary predicate clause.
The proposals seem viable, but more work is required on their ingredients, in particular on the
implications of these assumptions for other domains of research.
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